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Attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) can lead to significant physical damage. While offline safety and security assessments can provide insight into vulnerable system components, they may not account for stealthy attacks designed to…
As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…
We study the performance of perception-based control systems in the presence of attacks, and provide methods for modeling and analysis of their resiliency to stealthy attacks on both physical and perception-based sensing. Specifically, we…
Stealth attacks pose potential risks to cyber-physical systems because they are difficult to detect. Assessing the risk of systems under stealth attacks remains an open challenge, especially in nonlinear systems. To comprehensively quantify…
In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy false data injection attacks on sensors. We start by defining the stealthiness notion in the most general form where an attack is…
The increase in network connectivity has also resulted in several high-profile attacks on cyber-physical systems. An attacker that manages to access a local network could remotely affect control performance by tampering with sensor…
In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy sensor attacks. We start by defining the notion of stealthy attacks in the most general form by leveraging Neyman-Pearson lemma;…
Industrial control systems (ICS), which in many cases are components of critical national infrastructure, are increasingly being connected to other networks and the wider internet motivated by factors such as enhanced operational…
Stealthy sensor injection attacks are serious threats for industrial plants as they can compromise the plant's integrity without being detected by traditional fault detectors. In this manuscript, we study the possibility of revealing the…
In this paper, we propose an effective and easily deployable approach to detect the presence of stealthy sensor attacks in industrial control systems, where (legacy) control devices critically rely on accurate (and usually non-encrypted)…
This paper considers a sensor attack and fault detection problem for linear cyber-physical systems, which are subject to system noise that can obey an unknown light-tailed distribution. We propose a new threshold-based detection mechanism…
Maintaining stability in feedback systems, from aircraft and autonomous robots to biological and physiological systems, relies on monitoring their behavior and continuously adjusting their inputs. Incremental damage can make such control…
As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…
Todays industrial control systems consist of tightly coupled components allowing adversaries to exploit security attack surfaces from the information technology side, and, thus, also get access to automation devices residing at the…
In this work, we evaluate theoretical results on the feasibility of, the worst-case impact of, and defense mechanisms against a stealthy sensor attack in an experimental setup. We demonstrate that for a controller with stable dynamics the…
High-risk industries like nuclear and aviation use real-time monitoring to detect dangerous system conditions. Similarly, Large Language Models (LLMs) need monitoring safeguards. We propose a real-time framework to predict harmful AI…
In recent years, a number of process-based anomaly detection schemes for Industrial Control Systems were proposed. In this work, we provide the first systematic analysis of such schemes, and introduce a taxonomy of properties that are…
Closed-loop control systems employ continuous sensing and actuation to maintain controlled variables within preset bounds and achieve the desired system output. Intentional disturbances in the system, such as in the case of cyberattacks,…
Until two decades ago, industrial networks were deemed secure due to physical separation from public networks. An abundance of successful attacks proved that assumption wrong. Intrusion detection solutions for industrial application need to…
Stealthy false data injection attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs) introduce erroneous measurement information to on-board sensors with the purpose to degrade system performance. An intelligent attacker is able to leverage knowledge of…