Related papers: Dynamic mechanism design: An elementary introducti…
We study Bayesian automated mechanism design in unstructured dynamic environments, where a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent, and takes actions based on the strategic agent's report of the current state of the world. Both the…
We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
Lately, the problem of designing multi-stage dynamic mechanisms has been shown to be both theoretically challenging and practically important. In this paper, we consider the problem of designing revenue optimal dynamic mechanism for a…
Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly untruthful reports of participating agents. Optimizing…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
We consider the problem of designing an expected-revenue maximizing mechanism for allocating multiple non-perishable goods of $k$ varieties to flexible consumers over $T$ time steps. In our model, a random number of goods of each variety…
When are dynamics valuable? In Bayesian environments with public signals and no intertemporal commitment, we study a seller who allocates an economically single-shot resource over time. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under…
We investigate the problem of market mechanism design for wind energy. We consider a dynamic two-step model with one strategic seller with wind generation and one buyer, who trade energy through a mechanism determined by a designer. The…
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…
This research delves into optimizing mechanism design, with an emphasis on the energy efficiency and the expansive design possibilities of reciprocating mechanisms. It investigates how to efficiently integrate Computer-Aided Design (CAD)…
This paper examines necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms when the domain of valuations is restricted. Our approach is to appropriately define the total valuation function, which is the expected…
We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experience with items that are auctioned repeatedly over an infinite…
This research considers the ranking and selection with input uncertainty. The objective is to maximize the posterior probability of correctly selecting the best alternative under a fixed simulation budget, where each alternative is measured…
Real-world robots are becoming increasingly complex and commonly act in poorly understood environments where it is extremely challenging to model or learn their true dynamics. Therefore, it might be desirable to take a task-specific…
Using the tools of the Markov Decision Processes, we justify the dynamic programming approach to the optimal impulse control of deterministic dynamical systems. We prove the equivalence of the integral and differential forms of the…
In this paper we study the problem of designing periodic orbits for a special class of hybrid systems, namely mechanical systems with underactuated continuous dynamics and impulse events. We approach the problem by means of optimal control.…
The long-time behaviour of many dynamical systems may be effectively predicted by a low-dimensional model that describes the evolution of a reduced set of variables. We consider the question of how to equip such a low-dimensional model with…
We propose practical extensions to Bayesian optimization for solving dynamic problems. We model dynamic objective functions using spatiotemporal Gaussian process priors which capture all the instances of the functions over time. Our…
Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…