Related papers: Cooperation and competition between pair and multi…
Evolutionary game theory has proven to be an elegant framework providing many fruitful insights in population dynamics and human behaviour. Here, we focus on the aspect of behavioural plasticity and its effect on the evolution of…
Synergies between evolutionary game theory and statistical physics have significantly improved our understanding of public cooperation in structured populations. Multiplex networks, in particular, provide the theoretical framework within…
Indirect reciprocity unveils how social cooperation is founded upon moral systems. Within the frame of dyadic games based on individual reputations, the "leading-eight" strategies distinguish themselves in promoting and sustaining…
Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from antibiotics overuse to biodiversity…
In the traditional setup of public goods game all players are involved in every available groups and the mutual benefit is shared among competing cooperator and defector strategies. But in real life situations the group formation of players…
Cooperation underlies many natural and artificial systems. While voluntary participation can sustain cooperation without informational assumptions, real interactions are rarely anonymous, leaving the joint effects of participation and…
We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower…
We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on different regular graphs as a function of the noise level underlying strategy adoptions. We focus on the effects that are brought about by different group sizes of public goods…
Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because…
Understanding the emergence of cooperation in social networks has advanced through pairwise interactions, but the corresponding theory for group-based public goods games (PGGs) remains less explored. Here, we provide theoretical conditions…
The paper studies the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior in populations of agents who interact among themselves in Prisoner's Dilemma games and who are allowed to choose their partners. The population is then subject to…
Cooperation and competition are fundamental forces shaping both natural and human systems, yet their interplay remains poorly understood. The Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) has long served as a foundational framework in Game Theory for…
We consider a dual model of decision making, in which an individual forms its opinion based on contrasting mechanisms of imitation and rational calculation. The decision making model (DMM) implements imitating behavior by means of a network…
Cooperation arises in nature at every scale, from within cells to entire ecosystems. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, public goods games (PGGs) are used to analyse scenarios where individuals can cooperate or defect, and can…
This paper proposes a mathematical model for the coevolution of actions and opinions for a population facing a social dilemma. In particular, we assume each person participates in a Public Goods Game (PGG), with their action being to…
Recently, the eco-evolutionary game theory which describes the coupled dynamics of strategies and environment have attracted great attention. At the same time, most of the current work is focused on the classic two-player two-strategy game.…
Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The…
The sampling of interaction partners depends on often implicit modelling assumptions, yet has marked effects on the dynamics in evolutionary games. One particularly important aspect is whether or not competitors also interact. Population…
An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…