Related papers: Individually Rational Land and Neighbor Allocation…

We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of incentive compatibility (strategy-proofness), Pareto…

In practice, most mechanisms for selling, buying, matching, voting, and so on are not incentive compatible. We present techniques for estimating how far a mechanism is from incentive compatible. Given samples from the agents' type…

A fundamental resource allocation setting is the random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects that are then randomly allocated to the agents. In 2001, Bogomolnaia and Moulin presented the probabilistic serial…

In many competitive settings, from education to politics, rules do not reward effort evenly, and thresholds (e.g., grade cutoffs or electoral majorities) make some moments disproportionately important. Success thus depends on efficiently…

We study the subtlety of optimal paternalism when a utilitarian planner has the power to design a discrete choice set for a heterogeneous population with bounded rationality. We first consider the planning problem in abstraction. We show…

Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…

Fairness and privacy are two important concerns in social decision-making processes such as resource allocation. We study privacy in the fair allocation of indivisible resources using the well-established framework of differential privacy.…

This paper studies preference aggregation under risk. In our model, each agent has an incomplete preference relation represented by a set of expected utility functions. The classical Pareto principle is silent on agreement involving…

In many real-world settings, institutions can and do adjust the consequences attached to algorithmic classification decisions, such as the size of fines, sentence lengths, or benefit levels. We refer to these consequences as the stakes…

Fairness in language models is typically studied as a property of a single, centrally optimized model. As large language models become increasingly agentic, we propose that fairness emerges through interaction and exchange. We study this…

We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement outcome is private (and possibly correlated) information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that if the Pareto frontier is linear,…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible resources among agents. Most prior work focuses on fairness and/or efficiency among agents. However, the allocator, as the resource owner, may also be involved in many scenarios (e.g., government…

We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…

We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these…

We consider a fair division setting where indivisible items are allocated to agents. Each agent in the setting has strictly negative, zero or strictly positive utility for each item. We, thus, make a distinction between items that are good…

Consider a university assigning students to courses and dorms. While many mechanisms are available, they each have their own drawbacks. Running serial dictatorship once for all goods is highly unfair, but running serial dictatorship…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible public goods. We model the public goods as elements with feasibility constraints on what subsets of elements can be chosen, and assume that agents have additive utilities across…

We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete and transitive ranking. We adapt envy-freeness,…

Self-modification of agents embedded in complex environments is hard to avoid, whether it happens via direct means (e.g. own code modification) or indirectly (e.g. influencing the operator, exploiting bugs or the environment). It has been…

Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…