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Related papers: Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

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In this paper we show that, using only mild assumptions, previously proposed multidimensional blockchain fee markets are essentially optimal, even against worst-case adversaries. In particular, we show that the average welfare gap between…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-05-21 Guillermo Angeris , Theo Diamandis , Ciamac Moallemi

Transaction fee plays an important role in determining the priority of transaction processing in public blockchain systems. Owing to the observability of unconfirmed transactions, a strategic user can postpone his transaction broadcasting…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-12-29 Qianlan Bai , Yuedong Xu , Zhijian Zhou , Xin Wang

This paper studies the optimal transaction fee mechanisms for blockchains, focusing on the distinction between price-based ($\mathcal{P}$) and quantity-based ($\mathcal{Q}$) controls. By analyzing factors such as demand uncertainty,…

General Economics · Economics 2025-02-26 Abdoulaye Ndiaye

Blockchains have popularized automated market makers (AMMs). An AMM exchange is an application running on a blockchain which maintains a pool of crypto-assets and automatically trades assets with users governed by some pricing function that…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-09-16 T-H. Hubert Chan , Ke Wu , Elaine Shi

In order to have transactions executed and recorded on blockchains such as the Ethereum Mainnet, fees expressed in crypto-currency units of the blockchain must be paid. One can buy crypto-currency called Ether of the Ethereum blockchain…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2021-08-20 Serdar Metin , Can Özturan

Roughgarden (2020) initiates the study of Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs), and posits that the on-chain game of a ``good'' TFM should be on-chain simple (OnCS), i.e., incentive compatible for users and the miner. Recent work of Ganesh,…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-12-03 Aadityan Ganesh , Clayton Thomas , S. Matthew Weinberg

In the context of decentralized blockchains, accurately simulating the outcome of order flow auctions (OFAs) off-chain is challenging due to adversarial sequencing, encrypted bids, and frequent state changes. Existing approaches, such as…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-03-12 Alex Watts , Davide Sinesi , Jacob Greene

Miners in a blockchain system are suffering from ever-increasing storage costs, which in general have not been properly compensated by the users' transaction fees. This reduces the incentives for the miners' participation and may jeopardize…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-08-24 Yunshu Liu , Zhixuan Fang , Man Hon Cheung , Wei Cai , Jianwei Huang

Existing permissionless blockchain solutions rely on peer-to-peer propagation mechanisms, where nodes in a network transfer transaction they received to their neighbors. Unfortunately, there is no explicit incentive for such transaction…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2018-06-15 Oguzhan Ersoy , Zhijie Ren , Zekeriya Erkin , Reginald L. Lagendijk

Mining processes of Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies are currently incentivized with voluntary transaction fees and fixed block rewards which will halve gradually to zero. In the setting where optional and arbitrary transaction fee…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2022-07-14 Tiantian Gong , Mohsen Minaei , Wenhai Sun , Aniket Kate

Off-chain transaction channels represent one of the leading techniques to scale the transaction throughput in cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. They allow multiple agents to route payments through one another. So far, the topology and…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2020-07-28 Yotam Sali , Aviv Zohar

Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies secure a decentralized consensus protocol by incentives. The protocol participants, called miners, generate (mine) a series of blocks, each containing monetary transactions created by system users. As…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2018-11-14 Itay Tsabary , Ittay Eyal

Ethereum is one of the most popular blockchain systems that supports more than half a million transactions every day and fosters miscellaneous decentralized applications with its Turing-complete smart contract machine. Whereas it remains…

Social and Information Networks · Computer Science 2020-01-16 Qianlan Bai , Chao Zhang , Yuedong Xu , Xiaowei Chen , Xin Wang

Bitcoin has witnessed a prevailing transition that employing transaction fees paid by users rather than subsidy assigned by the system as the main incentive for mining.

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-01-01 Hongwei Shi , Shengling Wang , Qin Hu , Xiuzhen Cheng , Jianhui Huang

This paper analyzes the Execution Tickets proposal on Ethereum Research, unveiling its potential to revolutionize the Ethereum blockchain's economic model. At the core of this proposal lies a novel ticketing mechanism poised to redefine how…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2024-04-09 Jonah Burian

Traditional blockchain design gives miners or validators full control over transaction ordering, i.e., they can freely choose which transactions to include or exclude, as well as in which order. While not an issue initially, the emergence…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2023-12-19 Andrei Constantinescu , Diana Ghinea , Lioba Heimbach , Zilin Wang , Roger Wattenhofer

A blockchain, such as Bitcoin, is an append-only, secure, transparent, distributed ledger. A fair blockchain is expected to have healthy metrics; high honest mining power, low processing latency, i.e., low wait times for transactions and…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2020-03-03 Shoeb Siddiqui , Ganesh Vanahalli , Sujit Gujar

In permissionless blockchains, transaction issuers include a fee to incentivize miners to include their transactions. To accurately estimate this prioritization fee for a transaction, transaction issuers (or blockchain participants, more…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-05-25 Johnnatan Messias , Vabuk Pahari , Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran , Krishna P. Gummadi , Patrick Loiseau

In this paper, we present a pricing mechanism that aligns incentives of agents who exchange resources on a decentralized ledger with the goal of maximizing transaction throughput. Subdividing a blockchain ledger into shards promises to…

Systems and Control · Electrical Eng. & Systems 2020-09-02 James R. Riehl , Jonathan Ward

Blockchains rely on economic incentives to ensure secure and decentralised operation, making incentive compatibility a core design concern. However, protocols are rarely deployed in isolation. Applications interact with the underlying…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2026-04-08 Zeta Avarikioti , Georg Fuchsbauer , Pim Keer , Matteo Maffei , Fabian Regen