Related papers: An algebraic approach to revealed preferences
The emergence of tools based on artificial intelligence has also led to the need of producing explanations which are understandable by a human being. In most approaches, the system is considered a black box, making it difficult to generate…
We study preferences estimated from finite choice experiments and provide sufficient conditions for convergence to a unique underlying "true" preference. Our conditions are weak, and therefore valid in a wide range of economic environments.…
We present a unified logical framework for representing and reasoning about both probability quantitative and qualitative preferences in probability answer set programming, called probability answer set optimization programs. The proposed…
Literature involving preferences of artificial agents or human beings often assume their preferences can be represented using a complete transitive binary relation. Much has been written however on different models of preferences. We review…
We present a preference learning framework for multiple criteria sorting. We consider sorting procedures applying an additive value model with diverse types of marginal value functions (including linear, piecewise-linear, splined, and…
We propose algebraic protocols that enable the definition of protocol templates and session types analogous to the definition of domain-specific types with algebraic datatypes. Parameterized algebraic protocols subsume all regular as well…
This paper unifies two key results from economic theory, namely, revealed rational inattention and classical revealed preference. Revealed rational inattention tests for rationality of information acquisition for Bayesian decision makers.…
We study here preference revision, considering both the monotonic case where the original preferences are preserved and the nonmonotonic case where the new preferences may override the original ones. We use a relational framework in which…
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structure makes it easier to reason about preferences, and…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
Given only aggregate choice data and limited information about how menus are distributed across the population, we describe what can be inferred robustly about the distribution of preferences (or more general decision rules). We strengthen…
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…
Classical Decision Theory provides a normative framework for representing and reasoning about complex preferences. Straightforward application of this theory to automate decision making is difficult due to high elicitation cost. In response…
In this paper, we present a link between preference-based and multiobjective sequential decision-making. While transforming a multiobjective problem to a preference-based one is quite natural, the other direction is a bit less obvious. We…
Experimental work regularly finds that individual choices are not deterministically rationalized by well-defined preferences. Nonetheless, recent work shows that data collected from many individuals can be stochastically rationalized by a…
A structure called a decision making problem is considered. The set of outcomes (consequences) is partially ordered according to the decision maker's preferences. The problem is how these preferences affect a decision maker to prefer one of…
User-driven privacy allows individuals to control whether and at what granularity their data is shared, leading to datasets that mix original, generalized, and missing values within the same records and attributes. While such…
Conventional preference learning methods often prioritize opinions held more widely when aggregating preferences from multiple evaluators. This may result in policies that are biased in favor of some types of opinions or groups and…
We revisit a classical question of how individual consumer preferences and incomes shape aggregate behavior. We develop a method that applies to populations with homothetic preferences and reduces the hard problem of aggregation to simply…
The standard rational choice model describes individuals as making choices by selecting the best option from a menu. A wealth of evidence instead suggests that individuals often filter menus into smaller sets - consideration sets - from…