Related papers: A Note on Optimal Fees for Constant Function Marke…
This paper mathematically models a constant-function automated market maker (CFAMM) position as a portfolio of exotic options, known as perpetual American continuous-installment (CI) options. This model replicates an AMM position's delta at…
Decentralised automated market makers (AMMs) have gained significant attention recently. We propose an adaptive and automated Dynamic Function Market Maker (DFMM) that addresses challenges in this space. Our DFMM protocol includes a data…
We studied the behavior and variation of utility between the two conflicting players in a closed Nash-equilibrium loop. Our modeling approach also captured the nexus between optimal premium strategizing and firm performance using the…
Concentrated liquidity automated market makers (AMMs), such as Uniswap v3, enable liquidity providers (LPs) to earn liquidity rewards by depositing tokens into liquidity pools. However, LPs often face significant financial losses driven by…
Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs:…
The emergence of Concentrated Liquidity Market Makers (CLMMs) has made liquidity provision on decentralized exchanges an active and risk-sensitive task. However, the standalone profitability of liquidity provision remains unclear for…
We investigate expected utility maximization problems from the terminal liquidation value in continuous time in markets with transaction costs and one fixed consistent price system, where a non-concave utility function is defined on the…
We study a toy two-player game for periodic double auction markets to generate liquidity. The game has imperfect information, which allows us to link market spreads with signal strength. We characterize Nash equilibria in cases with or…
We study the pay-as-bid auction game, a supply function model with discriminatory pricing and asymmetric firms. In this game, strategies are non-decreasing supply functions relating pric to quantity and the exact choice of the strategy…
We analyze the efficiency of markets with friction, particularly power markets. We model the market as a dynamic system with $(d_t;\,t\geq 0)$ the demand process and $(s_t;\,t\geq 0)$ the supply process. Using stochastic differential…
We find an approximate Nash equilibrium in a game between decentralized exchanges (DEXs) that compete for order flow by setting dynamic trading fees. We characterize the equilibrium via a coupled system of partial differential equations and…
We develop an axiomatic theory for Automated Market Makers (AMMs) in local energy sharing markets and analyze the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the resulting economy with a Mean-Field Game. In this game, heterogeneous prosumers solve a…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are used to provide liquidity for combinatorial prediction markets that would otherwise be too thinly traded. They offer both buy and sell prices for any of the doubly exponential many possible securities that…
We revisit optimal execution of an active portfolio in the presence of slippage (aka linear, proportional, or absolute-value) costs. Market efficiency implies a close balance between active alphas and trading costs, so even small changes to…
The effectiveness of utility-maximization techniques for portfolio management relies on our ability to estimate correctly the parameters of the dynamics of the underlying financial assets. In the setting of complete or incomplete financial…
Liquidation of collateral are the primary safeguard for solvency of lending protocols in decentralized finance. However, the mechanics of liquidations expose these protocols to predatory price manipulations and other forms of Maximal…
We investigate stochastic differential games of optimal trading comprising a finite population. There are market frictions in the present framework, which take the form of stochastic permanent and temporary price impacts. Moreover,…
We study oligopolistic competition in service markets where firms offer a service to customers. The service quality of a firm - from the perspective of a customer - depends on the congestion and the charged price. A firm can set a price for…
AMMs are autonomous smart contracts deployed on a blockchain that make markets between different assets that live on that chain. In this paper we are examining a specific class of AMMs called Constant Function Market Makers whose trading…
Liquidity Providers on Automated Market Makers generate millions of USD in transaction fees daily. However, the net value of a Liquidity Position is vulnerable to price changes in the underlying assets in the pool. The dominant measure of…