Related papers: When is Assortment Optimization Optimal?
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
A fundamental task underlying many important optimization problems, from influence maximization to sensor placement to content recommendation, is to select the optimal group of $k$ items from a larger set. Submodularity has been very…
Fashion discounters face the problem of ordering the right amount of pieces in each size of a product. The product is ordered in pre-packs containing a certain size-mix of a product. For this so-called lot-type design problem, a stochastic…
The design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions, i.e. multi-item auctions over bundles of goods, is one of the most fundamental problems in computational economics, unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. In the…
We consider a natural dynamic staffing problem in which a decision-maker sequentially hires workers over a finite horizon to meet an unknown demand revealed at the end. Predictions about demand arrive over time and become increasingly…
Bayesian optimization offers a flexible framework to optimize an objective function that is expensive to be evaluated. A Bayesian optimizer iteratively queries the function values on its carefully selected points. Subsequently, it makes a…
We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the same…
We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem--a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds of resources to "unit-demand" agents with…
Optimal shelflisting invites profit maximization to become sensitive to the ways in which purchasing decisions are order-dependent. We study the computational complexity of the corresponding product arrangement problem when consumers are…
We study the revenue guarantees and approximability of item pricing. Recent work shows that with $n$ heterogeneous items, item-pricing guarantees an $O(\log n)$ approximation to the optimal revenue achievable by any (buy-many) mechanism,…
We consider a mechanism design setting with a single item and a single buyer who is uncertain about the value of the item. Both the buyer and the seller have a common model for the buyer's value, but the buyer discovers her true value only…
We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that have {\em sharp} multi-unit demand. This means that each buyer $i$ wants a specific number $d_i$ of items; a bundle of size less than $d_i$ has no value, while a…
In order for an e-commerce platform to maximize its revenue, it must recommend customers items they are most likely to purchase. However, the company often has business constraints on these items, such as the number of each item in stock.…
We study the problem of a budget limited buyer who wants to buy a set of items, each from a different seller, to maximize her value. The budget feasible mechanism design problem aims to design a mechanism which incentivizes the sellers to…
Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost…
Mathematical Selection is a method in which we select a particular choice from a set of such. It have always been an interesting field of study for mathematicians. Accordingly, Combinatorial Optimization is a sub field of this domain of…
The ranking problem is to order a collection of units by some unobserved parameter, based on observations from the associated distribution. This problem arises naturally in a number of contexts, such as business, where we may want to rank…
We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…
We study a problem of an online retailer who observes the unit sales of a product, and dynamically changes the retail price, in order to maximize the expected revenue. Assuming the demand of the product is price sensitive, we are interested…
We consider an optimal stopping problem with n correlated offers where the goal is to design a (randomized) stopping strategy that maximizes the expected value of the offer in the sequence at which we stop. Instead of assuming to know the…