Related papers: Cooperation in Threshold Public Projects with Bina…

We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model for public expenditure without an exogenously available…

Studying social dilemmas prompts the question of how cooperation can emerge in situations where individuals are expected to act selfishly. Here, in the framework of the one-shot Public Goods Game (PGG), we introduce the concept that…

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash…

A recently introduced concept of "cooperative equilibrium", based on the assumption that players have a natural attitude to cooperation, has been proven a powerful tool in predicting human behaviour in social dilemmas. In this paper, we…

Cooperation and defection may be considered as two extreme responses to a social dilemma. Yet the reality is much less clear-cut. Between the two extremes lies an interval of ambivalent choices, which may be captured theoretically by means…

Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The…

Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated,…

The basic social dilemma is frequently captured by a public goods game where participants decide simultaneously whether to support a common pool or not and after the enhanced contributions are distributed uniformly among all competitors.…

Understanding how cooperation emerges in public goods games is crucial for addressing societal challenges. While optional participation can establish cooperation without identifying cooperators, it relies on specific assumptions -- that…

A notion of pi-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance regarding payoffs in a game. This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a natural way. We show that…

The public goods game is one of the most famous models for studying the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. The multiplication factor in this game can characterize the investment return from the public good, which may be variable…

Facing a heavy task, any single person can only make a limited contribution and team cooperation is needed. As one enjoys the benefit of the public goods, the potential benefits of the project are not always maximized and may be partly…

A cooperative player invests effort into a common venture without knowing the partner's intention in advance. But this strategy can be implemented in various ways when a player is involved in different games simultaneously. Interestingly,…

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…

The tragedy of the commons illustrates a fundamental social dilemma where individual rational actions lead to collectively undesired outcomes, threatening the sustainability of shared resources. Strategies to escape this dilemma, however,…

In this paper, we rigorously study the problem of cost optimisation of hybrid (mixed) institutional incentives, which are a plan of actions involving the use of reward and punishment by an external decision-maker, for maximising the level…

The Optional Public Goods Game is a three-strategy game in which an individual can play as a cooperator or defector or decide not to participate. Despite its simplicity, this model can effectively represent many human social dilemmas, such…

Providing commons in the risky world is crucial for human survival, however, suffers more from the "free-riding" problem. Here, we proposed a solution that limits the access of the resource to an agent and tested its efficiency with a novel…

In order to coordinate players in a game must first identify a target pattern of behaviour. In this paper we investigate the difficulty of identifying prominent outcomes in two kinds of binary action coordination problems in social…

Networked public goods games model scenarios in which self-interested agents decide whether or how much to invest in an action that benefits not only themselves, but also their network neighbors. Examples include vaccination, security…