Related papers: Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in re…

This paper discusses the role of opportunistic punisher who may act selfishly to free-ride cooperators or not to be exploited by defectors. To consider opportunistic punisher, we make a change to the sequence of one-shot public good game;…

The idea of incompetence as a learning or adaptation function was introduced in the context of evolutionary games as a fixed parameter. However, live organisms usually perform different nonlinear adaptation functions such as a power law or…

Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

When people play a repeated game they usually try to anticipate their opponents' moves based on past observations, and then decide what action to take next. Behavioural economics studies the mechanisms by which strategic decisions are taken…

Repeated games consider a situation where multiple agents are motivated by their independent rewards throughout learning. In general, the dynamics of their learning become complex. Especially when their rewards compete with each other like…

We consider the problem of learning to exploit learning algorithms through repeated interactions in games. Specifically, we focus on the case of repeated two player, finite-action games, in which an optimizer aims to steer a no-regret…

We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true…

We introduce a class of learning problems where the agent is presented with a series of tasks. Intuitively, if there is relation among those tasks, then the information gained during execution of one task has value for the execution of…

Strategies for sustaining cooperation and preventing exploitation by selfish agents in repeated games have mostly been restricted to Markovian strategies where the response of an agent depends on the actions in the previous round. Such…

We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…

Cooperation, fairness, trust, and resource coordination are cornerstones of modern civilization, yet their emergence remains inadequately explained by the persistent discrepancies between theoretical predictions and behavioral experiments.…

Decades of scientific inquiry have sought to understand how evolution fosters cooperation, a concept seemingly at odds with the belief that evolution should produce rational, self-interested individuals. Most previous work has focused on…

Empirical evidence shows that human behaviour often deviates from game-theoretical rationality. For instance, humans may hold unrealistic expectations about future outcomes. As the evolutionary roots of such biases remain unclear, we…

Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect…

This study investigates the effect of behavioral mistakes on the evolutionary stability of the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated public goods game. Many studies show that behavioral mistakes have detrimental effects on cooperation…

Learning and adaptation play great role in emergent socio-economic phenomena. Complex dynamics has been previously found in the systems of multiple learning agents interacting via a simple game. Meanwhile, the single agent adaptation is…

Consider a system in which players at nodes of an underlying graph G repeatedly play Prisoner's Dilemma against their neighbors. The players adapt their strategies based on the past behavior of their opponents by applying the so-called…

We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…

Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the…