Related papers: Correlation-Robust Optimal Auctions
As autobidding systems increasingly dominate online advertising auctions, characterizing their long-term dynamical behavior is brought to the fore. In this paper, we examine the dynamics of autobidders who optimize value subject to a…
Classic results show that even an arbitrarily small correlation across bidders' information can enable full surplus extraction in auctions and related mechanism design settings. Motivated by this fragility, we study the information…
A canonical setting for non-monetary online resource allocation is one where agents compete over multiple rounds for a single item per round, with i.i.d. valuations and additive utilities across rounds. With $n$ symmetric agents, a natural…
In multi-item screening, optimal selling mechanisms are challenging to characterize and implement, even with full knowledge of valuation distributions. In this paper, we aim to develop tractable, interpretable, and implementable mechanisms…
We study the revenue performance of sequential posted price mechanisms and some natural extensions, for a general setting where the valuations of the buyers are drawn from a correlated distribution. Sequential posted price mechanisms are…
A seller wants to sell a good to a set of bidders using a credible mechanism. We show that when the seller has private information about her cost, it is impossible for a static mechanism to achieve the optimal revenue. In particular, even…
We analyze a model of selling a single object to a principal-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The principal and the agent have different assessments of the object's value to the firm. The agent is budget-constrained…
In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids…
In this paper, we introduce a Bayesian revenue-maximizing mechanism design model where the items have fixed, exogenously-given prices. Buyers are unit-demand and have an ordinal ranking over purchasing either one of these items at its given…
In the design and analysis of revenue-maximizing auctions, auction performance is typically measured with respect to a prior distribution over inputs. The most obvious source for such a distribution is past data. The goal is to understand…
We model a procurement scenario in which two \textit{imperfect} bidders act simultaneously on behalf of a single buyer, a configuration common in display advertising and referred to as \textit{side-by-side bidding} but largely unexplored in…
The progressive second-price auction of Lazar and Semret is a decentralized mechanism for the allocation and real-time pricing of a divisible resource. Our focus is on how delays in the receipt of bid messages, asynchronous analysis by…
We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (e.g., digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profit-maximizing auction design literature as it requires no…
We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume…
We consider a dynamic pricing problem for repeated contextual second-price auctions with multiple strategic buyers who aim to maximize their long-term time discounted utility. The seller has limited information on buyers' overall demand…
We study regret minimization in repeated first-price auctions (FPAs), where a bidder observes only the realized outcome after each auction -- win or loss. This setup reflects practical scenarios in online display advertising where the…
Motivated by large-market applications such as crowdsourcing, we revisit the problem of budget-feasible mechanism design under a "small-bidder assumption". Anari, Goel, and Nikzad (2018) gave a mechanism that has optimal competitive ratio…
Most modern ticketing systems rely on a first-come-first-serve or randomized allocation system to determine the allocation of tickets. Such systems has received considerable backlash in recent years due to its inequitable allotment and…
Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and individual rationality (IR). However, as the…
In this paper, we propose a novel sealed-bid auction framework to address the problem of dynamic spectrum allocation in cognitive radio (CR) networks. We design an optimal auction mechanism that maximizes the moderator's expected utility,…