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We propose a new defense mechanism against undetected infiltration into controllers in cyber-physical systems. To this end, we cautiously design the outputs of the sensors that monitor the state of the system. Different from the defense…
Cyber-physical systems integrate computation, communication, and physical capabilities to interact with the physical world and humans. Besides failures of components, cyber-physical systems are prone to malignant attacks, and specific…
This article considers the design and analysis of multiple moving target defenses for recognizing and isolating attacks on cyber-physical systems. We consider attackers who perform integrity attacks on a set of sensors and actuators in a…
Maintaining the security of control systems in the presence of integrity attacks is a significant challenge. In literature, several possible attacks against control systems have been formulated including replay, false data injection, and…
This work presents a rigorous analysis of the adverse effects of cyber-physical attacks on discrete-time distributed multi-agent systems, and propose a mitigation approach for attacks on sensors and actuators. First, we show how an attack…
The objective in this paper is to study and develop conditions for a network of multi-agent cyber-physical systems (MAS) where a malicious adversary can utilize vulnerabilities in order to ensure and maintain cyber attacks undetectable. We…
Cyber-physical systems integrate computation, communication, and physical capabilities to interact with the physical world and humans. Besides failures of components, cyber-physical systems are prone to malicious attacks so that specific…
This paper proposes an actuator security index based on the definition of perfect undetectability. This index can help a control system operator to localize the most vulnerable actuators in the networked control system, which can then be…
This paper analyzes stealthy attacks, particularly the zero-dynamics attack (ZDA) in networked control systems. ZDA hides the attack signal in the null-space of the state-space representation of the control system and hence it cannot be…
In this paper, we consider the problem of attack identification in cyber-physical systems (CPS). Attack identification is often critical for the recovery and performance of a CPS that is targeted by malicious entities, allowing defenders to…
This paper is concerned with the analysis and design of secure Distributed Control Systems in the face of integrity attacks on sensors and controllers by external attackers or insiders. In general a DCS consists of many heterogenous…
This paper studies the deployment of joint moving target defense (MTD) and deception against multi-stage cyberattacks. Given the system equipped with MTD that randomizes between different configurations, we investigate how to allocate a…
This chapter presents an overview on actuator attacks that exploit zero dynamics, and countermeasures against them. First, zero-dynamics attack is re-introduced based on a canonical representation called normal form. Then it is shown that…
We consider a sensor network focused on target localization, where sensors measure the signal strength emitted from the target. Each measurement is quantized to one bit and sent to the fusion center. A general attack is considered at some…
In this paper, we investigate detectability and identifiability of attacks on linear dynamical systems that are subjected to external disturbances. We generalize a concept for a security index, which was previously introduced for static…
This paper studies the impact of side initial state information on the detectability of data deception attacks against cyber-physical systems. We assume the attack detector has access to a linear function of the initial system state that…
In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy false data injection attacks on sensors. We start by defining the stealthiness notion in the most general form where an attack is…
Attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) which manipulate sensor readings can cause enormous physical damage if undetected. Detection of attacks on sensors is crucial to mitigate this issue. We study supervised regression as a means to…
Cyber-physical systems, such as self-driving cars or autonomous aircraft, must defend against attacks that target sensor hardware. Analyzing system design can help engineers understand how a compromised sensor could impact the system's…
Studying structural properties of linear dynamical systems through invariant subspaces is one of the key contributions of the geometric approach to system theory. In general, a model of the dynamics is required in order to compute the…