Related papers: Formalizing Stack Safety as a Security Property

A hyperproperty relates executions of a program and is used to formalize security objectives such as confidentiality, non-interference, privacy, and anonymity. Formally, a hyperproperty is a collection of allowable sets of executions. A…

We introduce a framework for reasoning about the security of computer systems using modal logic. This framework is sufficiently expressive to capture a variety of known security properties, while also being intuitive and independent of…

A security policy states the acceptable actions of an information system, as the actions bear on security. There is a pressing need for organizations to declare their security policies, even informal statements would be better than the…

Confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, authorization, and accountability are known as security properties that secure systems should preserve. They are usually considered as security final goals that are achieved by system…

We give a rigorous characterization of what it means for a programming language to be memory safe, capturing the intuition that memory safety supports local reasoning about state. We formalize this principle in two ways. First, we show how…

Safety and liveness stand as fundamental concepts in formal languages, playing a key role in verification. The safety-liveness classification of boolean properties characterizes whether a given property can be falsified by observing a…

Manipulations of return addresses on the stack are the basis for a variety of attacks on programs written in memory unsafe languages. Dual stack schemes for protecting return addresses promise an efficient and effective defense against such…

Language-based information flow security aims to decide whether an action-observable program can unintentionally leak confidential information if it has the authority to access confidential data. Recent concerns about declassification…

Due to their interesting features, blockchains have become popular in recent years. They are full-stack systems where security is a critical factor for their success. The main focus of this work is to systematize knowledge about security…

A program that maintains key safety properties even when interacting with arbitrary untrusted code is said to enjoy \emph{robust safety}. Proving that a program written in a mainstream language is robustly safe is typically challenging…

It is common to prove by reasoning over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data. But doing so leaves a gap between reasoning and reality that can only be filled by accounting for the behaviour of the compiler. This task is…

A security policy specifies a security property as the maximal information flow. A distributed system composed of interacting processes implicitly defines an intransitive security policy by repudiating direct information flow between…

Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is an important enabling technology for data privacy in modern distributed applications. Currently, proof methods for low-level MPC protocols are primarily manual and thus tedious and error-prone, and…

We propose a new formal criterion for secure compilation, providing strong security guarantees for components written in unsafe, low-level languages with C-style undefined behavior. Our criterion goes beyond recent proposals, which protect…

The distinction between safety and liveness properties is a fundamental classification with immediate implications on the feasibility and complexity of various monitoring, model checking, and synthesis problems. In this paper, we revisit…

Enforcing security requirements in networked information systems relies on security controls to mitigate the risks from increasingly dangerous threats. Configuring security controls is challenging; even nowadays, administrators must perform…

We propose a new formal criterion for evaluating secure compilation schemes for unsafe languages, expressing end-to-end security guarantees for software components that may become compromised after encountering undefined behavior---for…

Stack-based memory corruption vulnerabilities have long been exploited by attackers to execute arbitrary code or perform unauthorized memory operations. Various defense mechanisms have been introduced to mitigate stack memory errors, but…

Considering asynchronous shared memory systems in which any number of processes may crash, this work identifies and formally defines relaxations of queues and stacks that can be non-blocking or wait-free while being implemented using only…

The advent of large-scale, complex computing systems has dramatically increased the difficulties of securing accesses to systems' resources. To ensure confidentiality and integrity, the exploitation of access control mechanisms has thus…