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We study selection acting on phenotype in a collection of agents playing local games lacking Nash equilibria. After each cycle one of the agents losing most games is replaced by a new agent with new random strategy and game partner. The…
In evolutionary game theory, repeated two-player games are used to study strategy evolution in a population under natural selection. As the evolution greatly depends on the interaction structure, there has been growing interests in studying…
Prosocial behaviors are encountered in the donation game, the prisoner's dilemma, relaxed social dilemmas, and public goods games. Many studies assume that the population structure is homogeneous, meaning all individuals have the same…
The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a…
In a social network, individuals express their opinions on several interdependent topics, and therefore the evolution of their opinions on these topics is also mutually dependent. In this work, we propose a differential game model for the…
In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In…
In the game theory literature, there appears to be little research on equilibrium selection for normal-form games with an infinite strategy space and discontinuous utility functions. Moreover, many existing selection methods are not…
Evolutionary game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from science to engineering. Previous studies proposed a strategy updating mechanism, which successfully demonstrated that the scale-free network can…
This paper proposes a co-evolutionary model of directed graphs and three opinions, i.e., conservative$(+)$, neutral$(\odot)$ and liberal$(-)$. Agents update both opinions and social relationships with bias. We find that an emergent game…
Many complex adaptive systems contain a large diversity of specialized components. The specialization at the level of the microscopic degrees of freedom, and diversity at the level of the system as a whole are phenomena that appear during…
Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…
The prevailing methodology for analyzing population games and evolutionary dynamics in the large population limit assumes that a Poisson process (or clock) inherent to each agent determines when the agent can revise its strategy. Hence,…
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation…
We study the influence of complex graphs on the metastability and fixation properties of a set of evolutionary processes. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, where the fitness and selection are frequency-dependent and vary with…
Addressing both natural and societal challenges requires collective cooperation. Studies on collective-risk social dilemmas have shown that individual decisions are influenced by the perceived risk of collective failure. However, existing…
In the original Evolutionary Minority Game, a segregation into two populations with opposing preferences is observed under many circumstances. We show that this segregation becomes more pronounced and more robust if the dynamics are changed…
In this paper, we consider the competitive diffusion game, and study the existence of its pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when defined over general undirected networks. We first determine the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for two…
Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…
Dynamic environments shape diverse dynamics in evolutionary game systems. We introduce spatial heterogeneity of resources into the prisoner's dilemma game model to explore coevolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback. The…
One of the main challenges in distributed learning arises from the difficulty of handling heterogeneous local models and data. In light of the recent success of generative models, we propose to meet this challenge by building on the idea of…