Related papers: Optimize Neural Fictitious Self-Play in Regret Min…
A fundamental open problem in monotone game theory is the computation of a specific generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) among all the available ones, e.g. the optimal equilibrium with respect to a system-level objective. The existing GNE…
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…
Game theory is a very profound study on distributed decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent's private…
We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…
While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…
The problem of matching markets has been studied for a long time in the literature due to its wide range of applications. Finding a stable matching is a common equilibrium objective in this problem. Since market participants are usually…
This paper introduces the new concept of (follower) satisfaction in Stackelberg games and compares the standard Stackelberg game with its satisfaction version. Simulation results are presented which suggest that the follower adopting…
The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games; we close this fundamental gap in this paper. We first show…
Finding Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games remains a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Recent multi-round regularization methods offer a promising direction, yet existing approaches…
We study data corruption robustness in offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. Given a dataset of realized trajectories of two players, an adversary is allowed to modify an $\epsilon$-fraction of it. The learner's goal is to identify an…
We consider online learning problems in the realizable setting, where there is a zero-loss solution, and propose new Differentially Private (DP) algorithms that obtain near-optimal regret bounds. For the problem of online prediction from…
This paper considers repeated games in which one player has more information about the game than the other players. In particular, we investigate repeated two-player zero-sum games where only the column player knows the payoff matrix A of…
In the classic expert problem, $\Phi$-regret measures the gap between the learner's total loss and that achieved by applying the best action transformation $\phi \in \Phi$. A recent work by Lu et al., [2025] introduces an adaptive algorithm…
No-regret learning dynamics play a central role in game theory, enabling decentralized convergence to equilibrium for concepts such as Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) or Correlated Equilibrium (CE). In this work, we improve the…
Pseudo-games are a natural and well-known generalization of normal-form games, in which the actions taken by each player affect not only the other players' payoffs, as in games, but also the other players' strategy sets. The solution…
We revisit the problem of solving two-player zero-sum games in the decentralized setting. We propose a simple algorithmic framework that simultaneously achieves the best rates for honest regret as well as adversarial regret, and in addition…
We investigate convergence of decentralized fictitious play (DFP) in near-potential games, wherein agents preferences can almost be captured by a potential function. In DFP agents keep local estimates of other agents' empirical frequencies,…
Decentralised optimisation tasks are important components of multi-agent systems. These tasks can be interpreted as n-player potential games: therefore game-theoretic learning algorithms can be used to solve decentralised optimisation…
Decoding how rational agents should behave in shared systems remains a critical challenge within theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence and economics studies. Central to this challenge is the task of computing the solution…
Systems of competing agents can often be modeled as games. Assuming rationality, the most likely outcomes are given by an equilibrium (e.g. a Nash equilibrium). In many practical settings, games are influenced by context, i.e. additional…