Related papers: Exerting Control in Repeated Social Dilemmas with …
Direct reciprocity, stemming from repeated interactions among players, is one of the fundamental mechanisms for understanding the evolution of cooperation. However, canonical strategies for the repeated prisoner's dilemma, such as…
We studied the effect of three strategy updating rules in coevolving prisoner's dilemma games where agents (nodes) can switch both the strategy and social partners. Under two node-based strategy updating rules, strategy updating occurs…
In the aftermath of large-scale disasters, the scarcity of resources and the paralysis of infrastructure raise severe challenges to effective post-disaster recovery. Efficient coordination between shelters and victims plays a crucial role…
This paper investigates the evolution of strategic play where players drawn from a finite well-mixed population are offered the opportunity to play in a public goods game. All players accept the offer. However, due to the possibility of…
Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix…
The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the…
In the traditional setup of public goods game all players are involved in every available groups and the mutual benefit is shared among competing cooperator and defector strategies. But in real life situations the group formation of players…
We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent.…
Social dilemmas are situations where individuals face a temptation to increase their payoffs at a cost to total welfare. Building artificially intelligent agents that achieve good outcomes in these situations is important because many real…
Matrix games like Prisoner's Dilemma have guided research on social dilemmas for decades. However, they necessarily treat the choice to cooperate or defect as an atomic action. In real-world social dilemmas these choices are temporally…
A cooperative player invests effort into a common venture without knowing the partner's intention in advance. But this strategy can be implemented in various ways when a player is involved in different games simultaneously. Interestingly,…
Facing a heavy task, any single person can only make a limited contribution and team cooperation is needed. As one enjoys the benefit of the public goods, the potential benefits of the project are not always maximized and may be partly…
AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay…
The prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is a simple model for understanding cooperative patterns in complex systems consisting of selfish individuals. Here, we study a PD game problem in scale-free networks containing hierarchically organized…
In social dilemmas, most interactions are transient and susceptible to restructuring, leading to continuous changes in social networks over time. Typically, agents assess the rewards of their current interactions and adjust their…
We investigate the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in structured populations by introducing dimers, which are defined as that two players in each dimer always hold a same strategy. We find that influences of dimers on cooperation…
Understanding the evolution of cooperation in multiplayer games is of vital significance for natural and social systems. An important challenge is that group interactions often leads to nonlinear synergistic effects. However, previous…
We study the emergence of cooperation in large spatial public goods games. Without employing severe social-pressure against "defectors", or alternatively, significantly rewarding "cooperators", theoretical models typically predict a system…
The replicator dynamics of players choosing either mixed or pure strategies are usually regarded as equivalent, as long as strategies are played with identical frequencies. In this paper we show that a population of pure strategists can be…
In the game of investment in the common good, the free rider problem can delay the stakeholders' actions in the form of a mixed strategy equilibrium. However, it has been recently shown that the mixed strategy equilibria of the stochastic…