Related papers: Pareto Optimality, Functional Dependence and Colle…

We consider an optimal partition of resources (e.g. consumers) between several agents (e.g. experts), given utility functions ("wisdoms") for the agents and their capacities. This problem is a variant of optimal transport…

Agents in mixed-motive coordination problems such as Chicken may fail to coordinate on a Pareto-efficient outcome. Safe Pareto improvements (SPIs) were originally proposed to mitigate miscoordination in cases where players lack…

The prisoner's dilemma game is the most known contribution of game theory into social sciences. Here we describe new implications of this game for transactional and transformative leadership. While the autocratic (Stackelberg's) leadership…

This paper proposes an intent-aware multi-agent planning framework as well as a learning algorithm. Under this framework, an agent plans in the goal space to maximize the expected utility. The planning process takes the belief of other…

In a setting where heterogeneous agents interact to accomplish a given set of goals, cooperation is of utmost importance, especially when agents cannot achieve their individual goals by exclusive use of their own efforts. Even when we…

We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…

We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize…

Modern logics of dependence and independence are based on team semantics, which means that formulae are evaluated not on a single assignment of values to variables, but on a set of such assignments, called a team. This leads to high…

With the advent of multi-core processors, network-on-chip design has been key in addressing network performances, such as bandwidth, power consumption, and communication delays when dealing with on-chip communication between the increasing…

We focus on the problem of designing an artificial agent (AI), capable of assisting a human user to complete a task. Our goal is to guide human users towards optimal task performance while keeping their cognitive load as low as possible.…

In a context where a decision has to be taken collectively by several agents, the social choice problem consists in deciding whether there exists a socially acceptable rule that aggregates the individual preferences of the agents into a…

We explore the connection between an agent's decision problem and her ranking of information structures. We find that a finite amount of ordinal data on the agent's ranking of experiments is enough to identify her (finite) set of…

Team semantics is the mathematical framework of modern logics of dependence and independence in which formulae are interpreted by sets of assignments (teams) instead of single assignments as in first-order logic. In order to deepen the…

Agents care not only about the outcomes of collective decisions but also about how decisions are made. In many cases, both the outcome and the procedure affect whether agents see a decision as legitimate, justifiable, or acceptable. We…

We study the self-assembly of a complex network of collaborations among self-interested agents. The agents can maintain different levels of cooperation with different partners. Further, they continuously, selectively, and independently…

We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model for public expenditure without an exogenously available…

A principal designs an algorithm that generates a publicly observable prediction of a binary state. She must decide whether to act directly based on the prediction or to delegate the decision to an agent with private information but…

We address the problem of minimizing the long-run expected average cost of a complex system consisting of interactive subsystems. We formulate a multiobjective optimization problem of the one-stage expected costs of the subsystems and…

According to Dennett, the same system may be described using a `physical' (mechanical) explanatory stance, or using an `intentional' (belief- and goal-based) explanatory stance. Humans tend to find the physical stance more helpful for…

Economies and societal structures in general are complex stochastic systems which may not lend themselves well to algebraic analysis. An addition of subjective value criteria to the mechanics of interacting agents will further complicate…