Related papers: Verified Double Sided Auctions for Financial Marke…

We propose a mathematically rigorous framework for identifying and completing Coincidence of Wants (CoW) cycles in decentralized exchange (DEX) aggregators. Unlike existing auction based systems such as CoWSwap, our approach introduces an…

In a multiple-object auction, every bidder tries to win as many objects as possible with a bidding algorithm. This paper studies position-randomized auctions, which form a special class of multiple-object auctions where a bidding algorithm…

We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate the terms of their math which may include a monetary…

We present an extension to a certified financial contract management system that allows for templated declarative financial contracts and for integration with financial stochastic models through verified compilation into so-called…

Auction data often contain information on only the most competitive bids as opposed to all bids. The usual measurement error approaches to unobserved heterogeneity are inapplicable due to dependence among order statistics. We bridge this…

We present a new approach to machine learning-powered combinatorial auctions, which is based on the principles of Differential Privacy. Our methodology guarantees that the auction mechanism is truthful, meaning that rational bidders have…

We report on the development of an optimized and verified decision procedure for orthologic equalities and inequalities. This decision procedure is quadratic-time and is used as a sound, efficient and predictable approximation to classical…

This paper studies the incentives of the seller and buyers to shill bid in a single-item auction. An auction is seller identity-compatible if the seller cannot profit from pretending to be one or more bidders via fake identities. It is…

We study truthful mechanisms for hiring a team of agents in three classes of set systems: Vertex Cover auctions, k-flow auctions, and cut auctions. For Vertex Cover auctions, the vertices are owned by selfish and rational agents, and the…

Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied as an appropriate means for resource allocation in distributed and mulitagent decision problems. When agents value resources in combination rather than in isolation, they must often…

We consider the problem of building up trust in a network of online auctions by software agents. This requires agents to have a deeper understanding of auction mechanisms and be able to verify desirable properties of a given mechanism. We…

Recent attention on secure multiparty computation and blockchain technology has garnered new interest in developing auction protocols in a decentralized setting. In this paper, we propose a secure and private Vickrey auction protocol that…

We construct an empirically founded model of a repo trade intermediated by two broker-dealers and prove multiple equilibrium and the existence of equilibrium at the joint profit maximizing volume of trade. We then present a smart contract…

An online truthful budgeted matching problem is considered for a bipartite graph, where the right vertices are available ahead of time, and individual left vertices arrive sequentially. On arrival of a left vertex, its edge utilities (or…

Computer Algebra systems are widely spread because of some of their remarkable features such as their ease of use and performance. Nonetheless, this focus on performance sometimes leads to unwanted consequences: algorithms and computations…

The last decade has sparked several valiant efforts in deductive verification of distributed agreement protocols such as consensus and leader election. Oddly, there have been far fewer verification efforts that go beyond the core protocols…

Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension…

Recent work has addressed the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions so as to maximize revenue, most of which assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction. This does not…

We present three projects concerned with applications of proof assistants in the area of programming language theory and mathematics. The first project is about a certified compilation technique for a domain-specific programming language…

In a decentralized environment, exchanging resources requires users to bargain until an agreement is found. Moreover, human agreements involve a combination of collaborative and selfish behavior and often induce circularity, complicating…