Related papers: The Core of Approval Participatory Budgeting with …
In an indivisible participatory budgeting (PB) framework, we have a limited budget that is to be distributed among a set of projects, by aggregating the preferences of voters for the projects. All the prior work on indivisible PB assumes…
The core is a strong fairness notion in multiwinner voting and participatory budgeting (PB). It is known that the core can be empty if we consider cardinal utilities, but it is not known whether it is always satisfiable with…
In participatory budgeting we are given a set of projects---each with a cost, an available budget, and a set of voters who in some form express their preferences over the projects. The goal is to select---based on voter preferences---a…
Multi-winner approval voting selects a size-$k$ committee that aggregates voters' approval preferences over a set of alternatives. A central question is coalitional stability: No coalition should be able to pick a committee -- of size at…
In an approval-based committee election, the task is to select a committee of up to $k$ candidates from a set of $m$ candidates based on the preferences of $n$ voters, each of whom approves a subset of the candidates. A central open…
Core stability is a natural and well-studied notion for group fairness in multi-winner voting, where the task is to select a committee from a pool of candidates. We study the setting where voters either approve or disapprove of each…
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more…
In an approval-based committee election, the goal is to select a committee consisting of $k$ out of $m$ candidates, based on $n$ voters who each approve an arbitrary number of the candidates. The core of such an election consists of all…
The legitimacy of bottom-up democratic processes for the distribution of public funds by policy-makers is challenging and complex. Participatory budgeting is such a process, where voting outcomes may not always be fair or inclusive.…
We study a generalization of the standard approval-based model of participatory budgeting (PB), in which voters are providing approval ballots over a set of predefined projects and -- in addition to a global budget limit, there are several…
We consider the participatory budgeting problem where each of $n$ voters specifies additive utilities over $m$ candidate projects with given sizes, and the goal is to choose a subset of projects (i.e., a committee) with total size at most…
Participatory budgeting engages the public in the process of allocating public money to different types of projects. PB designs differ in how voters are asked to express their preferences over candidate projects and how these preferences…
A divisible budget must be allocated to several projects, and agents are asked for their opinion on how much they would give to each project. We consider that an agent is satisfied by a division of the budget if, for at least a certain…
Participatory Budgeting (PB) is commonly studied from an axiomatic perspective, where the aim is to design procedurally fair and economically efficient rules for voters with full information regarding their preferences. In contrast, we take…
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide on a set of projects to fund with a limited budget. We consider PB in a setting where voters report ordinal preferences over projects and have (possibly) asymmetric…
Participatory budgeting refers to the practice of allocating public resources by collecting and aggregating individual preferences. Most existing studies in this field often assume an additive utility function, where each individual holds a…
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process where citizens jointly decide on how to allocate public funds to indivisible projects. This paper focuses on PB processes where citizens may give additional money to projects they want to…
In participatory budgeting, communities collectively decide on the allocation of public tax dollars for local public projects. In this work, we consider the question of fairly aggregating the preferences of community members to determine an…
Participatory budgeting is a method of collectively understanding and addressing spending priorities where citizens vote on how a budget is spent, it is regularly run to improve the fairness of the distribution of public funds.…
We present a new model of collective decision making that captures important crowd-funding and donor coordination scenarios. In the setting, there is a set of projects (each with its own cost) and a set of agents (that have their budgets as…