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Microarchitectural timing attacks exploit subtle timing variations caused by hardware behaviors to leak sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce MCHammer, a novel side-channel technique that leverages machine clears induced by…

DRAM chips are vulnerable to read disturbance phenomena (e.g., RowHammer and RowPress), where repeatedly accessing or keeping open a DRAM row causes bitflips in nearby rows. Attackers leverage RowHammer bitflips in real systems to take over…

Rijndael was standardized in 2001 by National Institute of Standard and Technology as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). AES is still being used to encrypt financial, military and even government confidential data. In 2005, Bernstein…

Operating Systems enforce logical isolation using abstractions such as processes, containers, and isolation technologies to protect a system from malicious or buggy code. In this paper, we show new types of side channels through the file…

Time awareness is critical to a broad range of emerging applications -- in Cyber-Physical Systems and Internet of Things -- running on commodity platforms and operating systems. Traditionally, time is synchronized across devices through a…

Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process and steal secrets such as cryptographic keys. As suggested by…

Side channel attacks steal secret keys by cleverly leveraging information leakages and can, therefore, break encryption. Thus, detection and mitigation of side channel attacks is a very important problem, but the solutions proposed in the…

Ransomware core capability, unauthorized encryption, demands controls that identify and block malicious cryptographic activity without disrupting legitimate use. We present a probabilistic, risk-based access control architecture that…

Selective data protection is a promising technique to defend against the data leakage attack. In this paper, we revisit technical challenges that were neglected when applying this protection to real applications. These challenges include…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) on low-power microcontrollers (e.g., ARM TrustZone-M) enable isolation of Secure and Non-Secure software but still require both worlds to share resources, including interrupt controllers. In this model,…

Time variation during program execution can leak sensitive information. Time variations due to program control flow and hardware resource contention have been used to steal encryption keys in cipher implementations such as AES and RSA. A…

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a promising hardware-based technology for protecting sensitive computations from potentially compromised system software. However, recent research has shown that SGX is vulnerable to branch-shadowing…

Recently, the new ciphertext side channels resulting from the deterministic memory encryption in Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), enable ciphertexts to manifest identifiable patterns when being sequentially written to the same memory…

Protected user-level libraries have been proposed as a way to allow mutually distrusting applications to safely share kernel-bypass services. In this paper, we identify and solve several previously unaddressed obstacles to realizing this…

The PQDSS standardization process requires cryptographic primitives to be free from vulnerabilities, including timing and cache side-channels. Resistance to timing leakage is therefore an essential property, and achieving this typically…

Timing attacks are considered one of the most damaging side-channel attacks. These attacks exploit timing fluctuations caused by certain operations to disclose confidential information to an attacker. For instance, in asymmetric encryption,…

Timing-based side and covert channels in processor caches continue to be a threat to modern computers. This work shows for the first time a systematic, large-scale analysis of Arm devices and the detailed results of attacks the processors…

Serverless computing has revolutionized cloud computing by offering users an efficient, cost-effective way to develop and deploy applications without managing infrastructure details. However, serverless cloud users remain vulnerable to…

This paper introduces a run-time mechanism for preventing leakage of secure information in distributed systems. We consider a general concurrency language model, where concurrent objects interact by asynchronous method calls and futures.…

In modern computing environments, hardware resources are commonly shared, and parallel computation is widely used. Parallel tasks can cause privacy and security problems if proper isolation is not enforced. Intel proposed SGX to create a…