Related papers: SchedGuard: Protecting against Schedule Leaks Usin…

We demonstrate the presence of a novel scheduler side-channel in preemptive, fixed-priority real-time systems (RTS); examples of such systems can be found in automotive systems, avionic systems, power plants and industrial control systems…

Real-time cyber-physical systems depend on deterministic task execution to guarantee safety and correctness. Unfortunately, this determinism can unintentionally expose timing information that enables adversaries to infer task execution…

Timing channels are a significant and growing security threat in computer systems, with no established solution. We have recently argued that the OS must provide time protection, in analogy to the established memory protection, to protect…

Timing channels enable data leakage that threatens the security of computer systems, from cloud platforms to smartphones and browsers executing untrusted third-party code. Preventing unauthorised information flow is a core duty of the…

Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…

The deterministic (timing) behavior of real-time systems (RTS) can be used by adversaries - say, to launch side channel attacks or even destabilize the system by denying access to critical resources. We propose a protocol (named REORDER) to…

This paper presents a schedule randomization algorithm that reduces the vulnerability of real-time systems to timing inference attacks which attempt to learn the timing of task execution. It utilizes run-time information readily available…

Linux containers are gaining increasing traction in both individual and industrial use, and as these containers get integrated into mission-critical systems, real-time detection of malicious cyber attacks becomes a critical operational…

Besides cryptographic secrets, side-channel attacks also leak sensitive user input. The most accurate attacks exploit cache timings or interrupt information to monitor keystroke timings and subsequently infer typed words and sentences.…

Micro-architectural attacks use information leaked through shared resources to break hardware-enforced isolation. These attacks have been used to steal private information ranging from cryptographic keys to privileged Operating System (OS)…

In real-time embedded systems (RTS), failures due to security breaches can cause serious damage to the system, the environment and/or injury to humans. Therefore, it is very important to understand the potential threats and attacks against…

In the recent past, we have witnessed the shift towards attacks on the microarchitectural CPU level. In particular, cache side-channels play a predominant role as they allow an attacker to exfiltrate secret information by exploiting the CPU…

The massive parallelism and resource sharing embodying today's cloud business model not only exacerbate the security challenge of timing channels, but also undermine the viability of defenses based on resource partitioning. We propose…

Modern computer processors use microarchitectural optimization mechanisms to improve performance. As a downside, such optimizations are prone to introducing side-channel vulnerabilities. Speculative loading of memory, called prefetching, is…

The wide deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) has given rise to strong demands for optimizing their inference performance. Today's techniques serving this purpose primarily focus on reducing latency and improving throughput through…

We present a software approach to mitigate access-driven side-channel attacks that leverage last-level caches (LLCs) shared across cores to leak information between security domains (e.g., tenants in a cloud). Our approach dynamically…

A container is a group of processes isolated from other groups via distinct kernel namespaces and resource allocation quota. Attacks against containers often leverage kernel exploits through system call interface. In this paper, we present…

Microarchitectural timing channels are a major threat to computer security. A set of OS mechanisms called time protection was recently proposed as a principled way of preventing information leakage through such channels and prototyped in…

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide an environment for running workloads in the cloud without having to trust cloud service providers, by offering additional hardware-assisted security guarantees. However, main memory encryption…

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) in modern real-time applications integrate numerous control units linked through communication networks, each responsible for executing a mix of real-time safety-critical and non-critical tasks. To ensure…