Related papers: Top Score in Axelrod Tournament
Ever since Axelrod's seminal work, tournaments served as the main benchmark for evaluating strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD). In this work, we first introduce a strategy for the IPD which outperforms previous tournament…
Direct reciprocity, typically studied using the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), is central to understanding how cooperation evolves. In the 1980s, Robert Axelrod organized two influential IPD computer tournaments, where Tit for Tat (TFT)…
The Axelrod library is an open source Python package that allows for reproducible game theoretic research into the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. This area of research began in the 1980s but suffers from a lack of documentation and test code.…
In this paper, we consider a planning problem for a hierarchical finite state machine (HFSM) and develop an algorithm for efficiently computing optimal plans between any two states. The algorithm consists of an offline and an online step.…
We consider optimal planning in a large-scale system formalised as a hierarchical finite state machine (HFSM). A planning algorithm is proposed computing an optimal plan between any two states in the HFSM, consisting of two steps: A…
This paper revisits a classical problem of slotted multiple access with success, idle, and collision events on each slot. First, results of a 2-user multiple access game are reported. The game was conducted at the University of Southern…
Researchers have explored the performance of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma strategies for decades, from the celebrated performance of Tit for Tat to the introduction of the zero-determinant strategies and the use of sophisticated learning…
We study equilibrium computation with extensive-form correlation in two-player turn-taking stochastic games. Our main results are two-fold: (1) We give an algorithm for computing a Stackelberg extensive-form correlated equilibrium (SEFCE),…
We focus on the problem of finding an optimal strategy for a team of two players that faces an opponent in an imperfect-information zero-sum extensive-form game. Team members are not allowed to communicate during play but can coordinate…
We explore the twin questions of when and why the strategy method creates behavioral distortions in the elicitation of choices in laboratory studies of sequential games. While such distortions have been widely documented, the theoretical…
In this paper, we consider a planning problem for a large-scale system modelled as a hierarchical finite state machine (HFSM) and develop a control algorithm for computing optimal plans between any two states. The control algorithm consists…
We present tournament results and several powerful strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma created using reinforcement learning techniques (evolutionary and particle swarm algorithms). These strategies are trained to perform well…
Tournaments are a widely used mechanism to rank alternatives in a noisy environment. This paper investigates a fundamental issue of economics in tournament design: what is the best usage of limited resources, that is, how should the…
This paper studies the optimization of strategies in the context of possibly randomized two players zero-sum games with incomplete information. We compare 5 algorithms for tuning the parameters of strategies over a benchmark of 12 games. A…
The study of convex optimization has historically been concerned with worst-case convergence rates. The development of the Optimized Gradient Method (OGM), due to \citet{drori2012PerformanceOF,Kim2016optimal}, marked a major milestone in…
We revisit the classic problem of optimal subset selection in the online learning set-up. Assume that the set $[N]$ consists of $N$ distinct elements. On the $t$th round, an adversary chooses a monotone reward function $f_t: 2^{[N]} \to…
We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…
Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's…
We consider the following simple game: We are given a table with ten slots indexed one to ten. In each of the ten rounds of the game, three dice are rolled and the numbers are added. We then put this number into any free slot. For each…
In J. Schwenk.(2018) ['What is the Correct Way to Seed a Knockout Tournament?' Retrieved from The American Mathematical Monthly], Schwenk identified a surprising weakness in the standard method of seeding a single elimination (or knockout)…