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We construct an empirically founded model of a repo trade intermediated by two broker-dealers and prove multiple equilibrium and the existence of equilibrium at the joint profit maximizing volume of trade. We then present a smart contract…

This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…

One of the most appealing aspects of the (coarse) correlated equilibrium concept is that natural dynamics quickly arrive at approximations of such equilibria, even in games with many players. In addition, there exist polynomial-time…

We consider two-player games played in real time on game structures with clocks and parity objectives. The games are concurrent in that at each turn, both players independently propose a time delay and an action, and the action with the…

Herman's self-stabilisation algorithm allows a ring of $N$ processors having any odd number of tokens to reach a stable state where exactly one token remains. McIver and Morgan conjecture that the expected time taken for stabilisation is…

This paper considers the problem of reliable broadcast in asynchronous authenticated systems, in which n processes communicate using signed messages and up to t processes may behave arbitrarily (Byzantine processes). In addition, for each…

This paper deals with an improvement of the "a-priori stability bounds" on the variation of the action variables and on the stability time obtained from a given Birkhoff normal form around the elliptic equilibrium point of an Hamiltonian…

As autonomous AI agents increasingly mediate online platform markets, a fundamental question emerges: do these markets generate stable strategic outcomes? In repeated strategic environments, the Nash equilibrium provides a natural benchmark…

We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check computation results. We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game without outside parties exists by a simple argument. We then proceed to calculate the…

The formal study of coalition formation in multi-agent systems is typically realized in the framework of hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this branch of research has been on the existence and the…

When solving the American options with or without dividends, numerical methods often obtain lower convergence rates if further treatment is not implemented even using high-order schemes. In this article, we present a fast and explicit…

Sequential decision making using Markov Decision Process underpins many realworld applications. Both model-based and model free methods have achieved strong results in these settings. However, real-world tasks must balance reward…

We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…

As multi-agent networks grow in size and scale, they become increasingly difficult to synchronize, though agents must work together even when generating and sharing different information at different times. Targeting such cases, this paper…

We examine online safe multi-agent reinforcement learning using constrained Markov games in which agents compete by maximizing their expected total rewards under a constraint on expected total utilities. Our focus is confined to an episodic…

Nearly a decade ago, Azrieli and Shmaya introduced the class of $\lambda$-Lipschitz games in which every player's payoff function is $\lambda$-Lipschitz with respect to the actions of the other players. They showed that such games admit…

In this paper, we consider a network of processors aiming at cooperatively solving mixed-integer convex programs subject to uncertainty. Each node only knows a common cost function and its local uncertain constraint set. We propose a…

We examine the relation between the size of the id space and the number of rational agents in a network under which equilibrium in distributed algorithms is possible. When the number of agents in the network is not a-priori known, a single…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…