Related papers: Identification and Estimation in Many-to-one Two-s…
We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary non-binding match offers that get finalized when a…
We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with perfectly transferable utilities. We do so without imposing parametric distributional assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity and with…
We study the problem of decision-making in the setting of a scarcity of shared resources when the preferences of agents are unknown a priori and must be learned from data. Taking the two-sided matching market as a running example, we focus…
The matching literature often recommends market centralization under the assumption that agents know their own preferences and that their preferences are fixed. We find counterevidence to this assumption in a quasi-experiment. In Germany's…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…
We develop inference for a two-sided matching model where the characteristics of agents on one side of the market are endogenous due to pre-matching investments. The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets…
Matching markets are often organized in a multi-stage and decentralized manner. Moreover, participants in real-world matching markets often have uncertain preferences. This article develops a framework for learning optimal strategies in…
This article proposes a characterization of admissions markets that can predict the distribution of students at each school or college under both centralized and decentralized admissions paradigms. The characterization builds on recent…
We study the identification and estimation of a multidimensional screening model, where a monopolist sells a multi-attribute product to consumers with private information about their multidimensional preferences. Under optimal screening,…
We study two-sided matching markets in which one side of the market (the players) does not have a priori knowledge about its preferences for the other side (the arms) and is required to learn its preferences from experience. Also, we assume…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
In many empirical studies of a large two-sided matching market (such as in a college admissions problem), the researcher performs statistical inference under the assumption that they observe a random sample from a large matching market. In…
Multi-category data arise in diverse fields including marketing, chemistry, public policy, genomics, political science, and ecology. We consider the problem of estimating ratios of category-specific means in a fully nonparametric setting,…
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
This paper studies decision-making and statistical inference for two-sided matching markets via matrix completion. In contrast to the independent sampling assumed in classical matrix completion literature, the observed entries, which arise…
In this paper we propose a Bayesian nonparametric model for clustering partial ranking data. We start by developing a Bayesian nonparametric extension of the popular Plackett-Luce choice model that can handle an infinite number of choice…
We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a…
This paper develops a method to use singles' data in a non-parametric revealed preference setting of collective household choice. We use it to test the controversial assumption of preference stability between singles and couples, without…