Related papers: On-Chain Auctions with Deposits
This paper studies inference in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with many bidders, using an asymptotic framework where the number of bidders increases while the number of auctions remains fixed. Our approach enables…
Milionis et al.(2023) studied the rate at which automated market makers leak value to arbitrageurs when block times are discrete and follow a Poisson process, and where the risky asset price follows a geometric Brownian motion. We extend…
Bid leakage is a corrupt scheme in a first-price sealed-bid auction in which the procurer leaks the opponents' bids to a favoured participant. The rational behaviour of such participant is to bid close to the deadline in order to receive…
In this paper, spectrum access in cognitive radio networks is modeled as a repeated auction game subject to monitoring and entry costs. For secondary users, sensing costs are incurred as the result of primary users' activity. Furthermore,…
Layer-two blockchain protocols emerged to address scalability issues related to fees, storage cost, and confirmation delay of on-chain transactions. They aggregate off-chain transactions into a fewer on-chain ones, thus offering immediate…
Online auctions play a central role in online advertising, and are one of the main reasons for the industry's scalability and growth. With great changes in how auctions are being organized, such as changing the second- to first-price…
Recent work has addressed the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions so as to maximize revenue, most of which assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction. This does not…
Modern ad auctions allow advertisers to target more specific segments of the user population. Unfortunately, this is not always in the best interest of the ad platform. In this paper, we examine the following basic question in the context…
A seller chooses a reserve price in a second-price auction to maximize worst-case expected revenue when she knows only the mean of value distribution and an upper bound on either values themselves or variance. Values are private and iid.…
In financial applications, latency advantages -- the ability to make decisions later than others, even without the ability to see what others have done -- can provide individual participants with an edge by allowing them to gather…
In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency…
In many auctions, bidders may be reluctant to reveal private information to the auctioneer and other bidders. Among deterministic bilateral communication protocols, reducing what bidders learn requires increasing what the auctioneer learns.…
We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in…
The Maker Protocol is a decentralized finance application that enables collateralized lending. The application uses open-bid, second-price auctions to complete its loan liquidation process. In this paper, we develop a bidding function for…
Blockchain systems often employ proof-of-work consensus protocols to validate and add transactions into hashchains. These protocols stimulate competition among miners in solving cryptopuzzles (e.g. SHA-256 hash computation in Bitcoin) in…
Most recent papers addressing the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction, which does not realistically model the Generalized…
Sequential auctions for identical items with unit-demand, private-value buyers are common and often occur periodically without end, as new bidders replace departing ones. We model bidder uncertainty by introducing a probability that a…
Many early order flow auction designs handle the payment for orders when they execute on the chain rather than when they are won in the auction. Payments in these auctions only take place when the orders are executed, creating a free option…
Blockchain transactions consume diverse resources, foremost among them storage, but also computation, communication, and others. Efficiently charging for these resources is crucial for effective system resource allocation and long-term…
We study the design of mechanisms -- e.g., auctions -- when the designer does not control information flows between mechanism participants. A mechanism equilibrium is leakage-proof if no player conditions their actions on leaked…