Related papers: Approval-Based Committee Voting under Incomplete I…
We present a new model that describes the process of electing a group of representatives (e.g., a parliament) for a group of voters. In this model, called the voting committee model, the elected group of representatives runs a number of…
Recovering and distinguishing between the strict-preference, indifference and/or indecisiveness parts of a decision maker's preferences is a challenging task but also important for testing theory and conducting welfare analysis. This paper…
Various voting rules are based on ranking the candidates by scores induced by aggregating voter preferences. A winner (respectively, unique winner) is a candidate who receives a score not smaller than (respectively, strictly greater than)…
We present a novel approach to the core set/instance selection problem in machine learning. Our approach is based on recent results on (proportional) representation in approval-based multi-winner elections. In our model, instances play a…
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that need to…
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide on a set of projects to fund with a limited budget. We consider PB in a setting where voters report ordinal preferences over projects and have (possibly) asymmetric…
Much research in electoral control -- one of the most studied form of electoral attacks, in which an entity running an election alters the structure of that election to yield a preferred outcome -- has focused on giving decision complexity…
To understand and summarize approval preferences and other binary evaluation data, it is useful to order the items on an axis which explains the data. In a political election using approval voting, this could be an ideological left-right…
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mathematical model: Elections as problem of choice or ranking. We show how the model can be enhanced to take into account the complete process…
Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial…
In perpetual voting, multiple decisions are made at different moments in time. Taking the history of previous decisions into account allows us to satisfy properties such as proportionality over periods of time. In this paper, we consider…
Core stability is a natural and well-studied notion for group fairness in multi-winner voting, where the task is to select a committee from a pool of candidates. We study the setting where voters either approve or disapprove of each…
In this paper, we study the problem of Participatory Budgeting (PB) with approval ballots, inspired by Multi-Winner Voting schemes. We present generalized preference aggregation methods for participatory budgeting, especially for finding…
Epistemic social choice aims at unveiling a hidden ground truth given votes, which are interpreted as noisy signals about it. We consider here a simple setting where votes consist of approval ballots: each voter approves a set of…
Lu and Boutilier proposed a novel approach based on "minimax regret" to use classical score based voting rules in the setting where preferences can be any partial (instead of complete) orders over the set of alternatives. We show here that…
Purpose: Multiwinner voting rules typically require full knowledge of voter preferences, which becomes impractical in large-scale or attention-limited settings. This paper investigates how accurately a winning committee can be approximated…
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…
In Approval-Based Committee (ABC) voting, each voter lists the candidates they approve and then a voting rule aggregates the individual approvals into a committee that represents the collective choice of the voters. An extensively studied…
We study the committee selection problem in the canonical impartial culture model with a large number of voters and an even larger candidate set. Here, each voter independently reports a uniformly random preference order over the…