Related papers: Distribution-Valued Games -- Overview, Analysis, a…
We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…
We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an…
We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…
We study variants of a stochastic game inspired by backgammon where players may propose to double the stake, with the game state dictated by a one-dimensional random walk. Our variants allow for different numbers of proposals and different…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
This paper considers information sharing in a multi-player repeated game. Every round, each player observes a subset of components of a random vector and then takes a control action. The utility earned by each player depends on the full…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
The commonly used accumulated payoff scheme is not invariant with respect to shifts of payoff values when applied locally in degree-inhomogeneous population structures. We propose a suitably modified payoff scheme and we show both formally…
High fidelity simulation of large-sized complex networks can be realized on a distributed computing platform that leverages the combined resources of multiple processors or machines. In a discrete event driven simulation, the assignment of…
This paper introduces alignment games, a new class of zero-sum games modeling strategic interventions where effectiveness depends on alignment with an underlying hidden state. Motivated by operational problems in medical diagnostics,…
Modern applications require robots to comply with multiple, often conflicting rules and to interact with the other agents. We present Posetal Games as a class of games in which each player expresses a preference over the outcomes via a…
The report suggests the concept of risk, outlining two mathematical structures necessary for risk genesis: the set of outcomes and, in a general case, partial order of preference on it. It is shown that this minimum partial order should…
We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…
This paper considers a class of reinforcement-learning that belongs to the family of Learning Automata and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in strategic-form games. For this class of dynamics, convergence to pure Nash equilibria has…
In a multi-objective game, each individual's payoff is a \emph{vector-valued} function of everyone's actions. Under such vectorial payoffs, Pareto-efficiency is used to formulate each individual's best-response condition, inducing…
We extend the optimin notion of Ismail (2025) from mixed strategy profiles to correlated distributions. A correlated distribution is evaluated by the worst expected payoff each player can receive when opponents may either obey their private…
We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…
We present a method of backward induction for computing approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria of infinitely repeated games with discounted payoffs. This uses the selection monad transformer, combined with the searchable set monad…
We consider a track selection problem for multi-target tracking in a multifunction radar network from a game-theoretic perspective. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game. The radars are considered to be players in this game…
We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as \emph{compromise values\/}. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining well-specified upper and lower bounds on payoffs.…