Related papers: Online Market Equilibrium with Application to Fair…
Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design, for example in fair division of items. However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of information (typically the valuation of every buyer for every…
The online bipartite matching problem, extensively studied in the literature, deals with the allocation of online arriving vertices (items) to a predetermined set of offline vertices (agents). However, little attention has been given to the…
The problem of arriving at a principled method of pricing goods and services was very satisfactorily solved for conventional goods; however, this solution is not applicable to digital goods. This paper studies pricing of a special class of…
We present a methodology to robustly estimate the competitive equilibria (CE) of combinatorial markets under the assumption that buyers do not know their precise valuations for bundles of goods, but instead can only provide noisy estimates.…
This paper focuses on the operation of an electricity market that accounts for participants that bid at a sub-minute timescale. To that end, we model the market-clearing process as a dynamical system, called market dynamics, which is…
Budgets play a significant role in real-world sequential auction markets such as those implemented by internet companies. To maximize the value provided to auction participants, spending is smoothed across auctions so budgets are used for…
Large-scale online recommendation systems must facilitate the allocation of a limited number of items among competing users while learning their preferences from user feedback. As a principled way of incorporating market constraints and…
Market equilibrium is one of the most fundamental solution concepts in economics and social optimization analysis. Existing works on market equilibrium computation primarily focus on settings with relatively few buyers. Motivated by this,…
We consider "time-of-use" pricing as a technique for matching supply and demand of temporal resources with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Relevant examples include energy, computing resources on a cloud computing platform, and…
We study an online version of the max-min fair allocation problem for indivisible items. In this problem, items arrive one by one, and each item must be allocated irrevocably on arrival to one of $n$ agents, who have additive valuations for…
In this work, we study a generalized Fisher market model that incorporates social influence. In this extended model, a buyer's utility depends not only on their own resource allocation but also on the allocations received by their…
Budget-management systems are one of the key components of modern auction markets. Internet advertising platforms typically offer advertisers the possibility to pace the rate at which their budget is depleted, through budget-pacing…
This paper combines two key ingredients for online algorithms - competitive analysis (e.g. the competitive ratio) and advice complexity (e.g. the number of advice bits needed to improve online decisions) - in the context of a simple online…
Recent literature on computational notions of fairness has been broadly divided into two distinct camps, supporting interventions that address either individual-based or group-based fairness. Rather than privilege a single definition, we…
Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are core ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the competition between online companies who offer prediction-based products,…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
We study a new but simple model for online fair division in which indivisible items arrive one-by-one and agents have monotone utilities over bundles of the items. We consider axiomatic properties of mechanisms for this model such as…
Competitive equilibrium (CE) is a fundamental concept in market economics. Its efficiency and fairness properties make it particularly appealing as a rule for fair allocation of resources among agents with possibly different entitlements.…
We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical Fisher market model, but with indivisible goods. In this model, every agent has a budget of artificial currency with which to purchase bundles of goods. Equilibrium prices match between…
Platforms design the form of presentation by which sellers are shown to the buyers. This design not only shapes the buyers' experience but also leads to different market equilibria or dynamics. One component in this design is through the…