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Related papers: HaPPY-Mine: Designing a Mining Reward Function

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We develop a model of coordination and allocation of decentralized multi-sided markets, in which our theoretical analysis is promisingly optimizing the decentralized transaction packaging process at high-throughput blockchains or Web 3.0…

General Economics · Economics 2023-01-27 Yuxuan Lu , Qian Qi , Xi Chen

We consider collaborative systems where users make contributions across multiple available projects and are rewarded for their contributions in individual projects according to a local sharing of the value produced. This serves as a model…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2013-08-06 Yoram Bachrach , Vasilis Syrgkanis , Milan Vojnovic

A hard-fork reconfiguration of the peer to peer Bitcoin network is described that substitutes tamper-evident logs and proof-of-stake consensus for proof-of-work consensus. The block creation rewards and transaction fees are reallocated to…

Computers and Society · Computer Science 2014-05-23 Stephen L. Reed

Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies prioritize transactions based on their fees, creating a unique kind of fee market. Empirically, this market has failed to yield stable equilibria with predictable prices for desired levels of service. We…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2019-01-23 Soumya Basu , David Easley , Maureen O'Hara , Emin Gün Sirer

Participation in permissionless blockchains results in competition over system resources, which needs to be controlled with fees. Ethereum's current fee mechanism is implemented via a first-price auction that results in unpredictable fees…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-06-08 Stefanos Leonardos , Barnabé Monnot , Daniël Reijsbergen , Stratis Skoulakis , Georgios Piliouras

Blockchains have popularized automated market makers (AMMs). An AMM exchange is an application running on a blockchain which maintains a pool of crypto-assets and automatically trades assets with users governed by some pricing function that…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-09-16 T-H. Hubert Chan , Ke Wu , Elaine Shi

Block space on the blockchain is scarce and must be allocated efficiently through block building. However, Ethereum's current block-building ecosystem, MEV-Boost, has become highly centralized due to integration, which distorts competition,…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2026-02-05 Mengqian Zhang , Sen Yang , Kartik Nayak , Fan Zhang

Miners in a blockchain system are suffering from ever-increasing storage costs, which in general have not been properly compensated by the users' transaction fees. This reduces the incentives for the miners' participation and may jeopardize…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-08-24 Yunshu Liu , Zhixuan Fang , Man Hon Cheung , Wei Cai , Jianwei Huang

In most popular public accessible cryptocurrency systems, the mining pool plays a key role because mining cryptocurrency with the mining pool turns the non-profitable situation into profitable for individual miners. In many recent novel…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2022-06-16 Boyang Li , Qing Lu , Weiwen Jiang , Taeho Jung , Yiyu Shi

Bitcoin constructs temporal order internally rather than synchronizing to any external clock. Empirical evidence shows that its time evolution is non-continuous, probabilistic, and self-regulated. Block discovery follows a stochastic…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-11-20 Bin Chen

Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include "on-chain" from the pool of all pending transactions. This paper investigates the…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-12-27 Tim Roughgarden

The energy sustainability of blockchains, whose consensus protocol rests on the Proof-of-Work, nourishes a heated debate. The underlying issue lies in a highly energy-consuming process, defined as mining, required to validate crypto-asset…

Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the transaction fee mechanism design fundamentally departs from classical…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-04-23 Ke Wu , Elaine Shi , Hao Chung

Optimistic responsiveness -- the ability of a consensus protocol to operate at the speed of the network -- is widely used in consensus protocol design to optimize latency and throughput. However, blockchain applications incentivize…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-10-30 Kaya Alpturer , Kushal Babel , Aditya Saraf

As an emerging decentralized secure data management platform, blockchain has gained much popularity recently. To maintain a canonical state of blockchain data record, proof-of-work based consensus protocols provide the nodes, referred to as…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2020-03-30 Yutao Jiao , Ping Wang , Dusit Niyato , Kongrath Suankaewmanee

Mining attacks allow adversaries to obtain a disproportionate share of the mining reward by deviating from the honest mining strategy in the Bitcoin system. Among them, the most well-known are selfish mining (SM), block withholding (BWH),…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-05-15 Junjie Hu , Chunxiang Xu , Zhe Jiang , Jiwu Cao

Blockchain-based federated learning (BCFL) has recently gained tremendous attention because of its advantages such as decentralization and privacy protection of raw data. However, there has been few research focusing on the allocation of…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2022-02-23 Zhilin Wang , Qin Hu , Ruinian Li , Minghui Xu , Zehui Xiong

Temporary fork is a fundamental phenomenon in many blockchains with proof of work, and the analysis of temporary fork has recently drawn great attention. Different from existing efforts that focus on the blockchain system factors such as…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2020-11-17 Canhui Chen , Xu Chen , Jiangshan Yu , Weigang Wu , Di Wu

A blockchain, such as Bitcoin, is an append-only, secure, transparent, distributed ledger. A fair blockchain is expected to have healthy metrics; high honest mining power, low processing latency, i.e., low wait times for transactions and…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2020-03-03 Shoeb Siddiqui , Ganesh Vanahalli , Sujit Gujar

We analyze the first and second moment risk premia in the Bitcoin market based on options and realized returns and contrast them to the premia embedded in the main US stock index market. First, Bitcoin is much more volatile and has a higher…

General Economics · Economics 2025-08-04 Caio Almeida , Maria Grith , Ratmir Miftachov , Zijin Wang