Related papers: Selectively Delaying Instructions to Prevent Micro…
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide an environment for running workloads in the cloud without having to trust cloud service providers, by offering additional hardware-assisted security guarantees. However, main memory encryption…
Side-channel attacks pose serious threats to many security models, especially sandbox-based browsers. While transient-execution side channels in out-of-order processors have previously been blamed for vulnerabilities such as Spectre and…
As cache-based side-channel attacks become serious security problems, various defenses have been proposed and deployed in both software and hardware. Consequently, cache-based side-channel attacks on processes co-residing on the same core…
This paper considers a class of multi-channel random access algorithms, where contending devices may send multiple copies (replicas) of their messages to the central base station. We first develop a hypothetical algorithm that delivers a…
Microarchitectural timing channels enable unwanted information flow across security boundaries, violating fundamental security assumptions. They leverage timing variations of several state-holding microarchitectural components and have been…
The implementations of most hardened cryptographic libraries use defensive programming techniques for side-channel resistance. These techniques are usually specified as guidelines to developers on specific code patterns to use or avoid.…
Recent architectural approaches that address speculative side-channel attacks aim to prevent software from exposing the microarchitectural state changes of transient execution. The Delay-on-Miss technique is one such approach, which simply…
Cache randomization has recently been revived as a promising defense against conflict-based cache side-channel attacks. As two of the latest implementations, CEASER-S and ScatterCache both claim to thwart conflict-based cache side-channel…
Transient execution attacks, also called speculative execution attacks, have drawn much interest as they exploit the transient execution of instructions, e.g., during branch prediction, to leak data. Transient execution is fundamental to…
Modern and future processors need to remain functionally correct in the presence of permanent faults to sustain scaling benefits and limit field returns. This paper presents a combined analytical and microarchitectural simulation-based…
The process of data analysis, especially in GUI-based analytics systems, is highly exploratory. The user iteratively refines a workflow multiple times before arriving at the final workflow. In such an exploratory setting, it is valuable to…
Traditional side-channels take advantage of secrets being used as inputs to unsafe instructions, used for memory accesses, or used in control flow decisions. Constant-time programming, which restricts such code patterns, has been widely…
The power consumption of a microprocessor is a huge channel for information leakage. While the most popular exploitation of this channel is to recover cryptographic keys from embedded devices, other applications such as mobile app…
Cache side channel attacks are increasingly alarming in modern processors due to the recent emergence of Spectre and Meltdown attacks. A typical attack performs intentional cache access and manipulates cache states to leak secrets by…
We present a kernel-level infrastructure that allows system-wide detection of malicious applications attempting to exploit cache-based side-channel attacks to break the process confinement enforced by standard operating systems. This…
New speculation-based attacks that affect large numbers of modern systems are disclosed regularly. Currently, CPU vendors regularly fall back to heavy-handed mitigations like using barriers or enforcing strict programming guidelines…
Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm…
Numerous previous works have studied deep learning algorithms applied in the context of side-channel attacks, which demonstrated the ability to perform successful key recoveries. These studies show that modern cryptographic devices are…
An extensive line of work on modern computing architectures has shown that the execution time of instructions can (i) depend on the operand of the instruction or (ii) be influenced by system optimizations, e.g., branch prediction and…
Microarchitectural attacks are a significant concern, leading to many hardware-based defense proposals. However, different defenses target different classes of attacks, and their impact on each other has not been fully considered. To raise…