Related papers: Competitive Equilibria with Unequal Budgets: Suppo…
We investigate a market without money in which agents can offer certain goods (or multiple copies of an agent-specific good) in exchange for goods of other agents. The exchange must be balanced in the sense that each agent should receive a…
We prove existence and uniqueness of stochastic equilibria in a class of incomplete continuous-time financial environments where the market participants are exponential utility maximizers with heterogeneous risk-aversion coefficients and…
I characterize optimal government policy in a sticky-price economy with different types of consumers and endogenous financial constraints in the banking and entrepreneurial sectors. The competitive equilibrium allocation is constrained…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
We investigate the tradeoffs between fairness and efficiency when allocating indivisible items over time. Suppose T items arrive over time and must be allocated upon arrival, immediately and irrevocably, to one of n agents. Agent i assigns…
We study Fisher markets that admit equilibria wherein each good is integrally assigned to some agent. While strong existence and computational guarantees are known for equilibria of Fisher markets with additive valuations, such equilibria,…
In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation game to understand the performance of a distributed market-based resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to distribute their budget (bids) among multiple machines…
Although both data availability and the demand for accurate forecasts are increasing, collaboration between stakeholders is often constrained by data ownership and competitive interests. In contrast to recent proposals within cooperative…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to budget-constrained agents, aiming to provide fairness and efficiency guarantees. Specifically, our goal is to ensure that the resulting allocation is envy-free up to any item (EFx)…
We consider a setting in which a group of agents share resources that must be allocated among them in each discrete time period. Agents have time-varying demands and derive constant marginal utility from each unit of resource received up to…
In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and…
Bringing fairness to energy resource allocation remains a challenge, due to the complexity of system structures and economic interdependencies among users and system operators' decision-making. The rise of distributed energy resources has…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and chores under category constraints. Specifically, there are $n$ agents and $m$ indivisible items which are partitioned into categories with associated capacities. An allocation…
We study how to incentivize agents in a target group to produce a higher output in the context of incomplete information, by means of rank-order allocation contests. We describe a symmetric Bayes--Nash equilibrium for contests that have two…
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the…
Constraints on agent's ability to pay play a major role in auction design for any setting where the magnitude of financial transactions is sufficiently large. Those constraints have been traditionally modeled in mechanism design as…
Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) is a classic solution to the problem of fair and efficient allocation of goods [Foley'67, Varian'74]. Every agent receives an equal budget of artificial currency with which to purchase…
We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in…
We consider the problem of finding Pareto-optimal allocations of risk among finitely many agents. The associated individual risk measures are law invariant, but with respect to agent-dependent and potentially heterogeneous reference…
We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical Fisher market model, but with indivisible goods. In this model, every agent has a budget of artificial currency with which to purchase bundles of goods. Equilibrium prices match between…