Related papers: Competition among Ride Service Providers with Auto…
Autonomous vehicles will be an integral part of ride-sharing services in the future. This setting differs from traditional ride-sharing marketplaces because of the absence of the supply side (drivers). However, it has far-reaching…
Emerging autonomous vehicles (AV) can either supplement the public transportation (PT) system or compete with it. This study examines the competitive perspective where both AV and PT operators are profit-oriented with dynamic adjustable…
This paper investigates the incentives of mobile network operators (MNOs) for acquiring additional spectrum to offer mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and thereby inviting competition for a common pool of end users (EUs). We consider…
We consider ride-sharing networks served by human-driven vehicles (HVs) and autonomous vehicles (AVs). We propose a model for ride-sharing in this mixed autonomy setting for a multi-location network in which a ride-sharing platform sets…
This paper investigates the impacts of competition in autonomous mobility-on-demand systems. By adopting a network-flow based formulation, we first determine the optimal strategies of profit-maximizing platform operators in monopoly and…
The presence of uncertainties in the ride-hailing market complicates the pricing strategies of on-demand platforms that compete each other to offer a mobility service while striving to maximize their profit. Looking at this problem as a…
Autonomous mobility on demand services have the potential to disrupt the future mobility system landscape. Ridepooling services in particular can decrease land consumption and increase transportation efficiency by increasing the average…
We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…
Both ride-hailing services and electric vehicles are becoming increasingly popular and it is likely that charging management of the ride-hailing vehicles will be a significant part of the ride-hailing company's operation in the near future.…
When a centrally operated ride-hailing company considers to enter a market already served by another company, it has to make a strategic decision about how to distribute its fleet among different regions in the area. This decision will be…
This paper investigates the equity impacts of autonomous vehicles (AV) on for-hire human drivers and passengers in a ride-hailing market, and examines regulation policies that protect human drivers and improve transport equity for…
We analyse a non-cooperative strategic game among two ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a certain patience level) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process at a…
We consider ride-sharing networks served byhuman-driven vehicles and autonomous vehicles. First, wepropose a novel model for ride-sharing in this mixed autonomysetting for a multi-location network in which the platformsets prices for…
We study the price competition in a duopoly with an arbitrary number of buyers. Each seller can offer multiple units of a commodity depending on the availability of the commodity which is random and may be different for different sellers.…
We analyse a non-cooperative game between two competing ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a limited level of patience) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process…
Motivated by the rapid development of autonomous vehicle technology, this work focuses on the challenges of introducing them in ride-hailing platforms with conventional strategic human drivers. We consider a ride-hailing platform that…
Decision-making for autonomous driving is challenging, considering the complex interactions among multiple traffic agents (e.g., autonomous vehicles (AVs), human drivers, and pedestrians) and the computational load needed to evaluate these…
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems are commonly used to model strategic interactions between self-interested agents who are coupled in cost and constraints. Specifically, the variational GNE, a refinement of the GNE, is often…
In a sponsored search auction, decisions about how to rank ads impose tradeoffs between objectives such as revenue and welfare. In this paper, we examine how these tradeoffs should be made. We begin by arguing that the most natural solution…
As the communication network is in transition towards a commercial one controlled by service providers (SP), the present paper considers a pricing game in a communication market covered by several wireless access points sharing the same…