Related papers: Advisors with Hidden Motives
We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after…
Secrecy in communication systems is measured herein by the distortion that an adversary incurs. The transmitter and receiver share secret key, which they use to encrypt communication and ensure distortion at an adversary. A model is…
We investigate how low-quality AI advisors, lacking quality disclosures, can help spread text-based lies while seeming to help people detect lies. Participants in our experiment discern truth from lies by evaluating transcripts from a game…
We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. We prove the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium when the insider…
The hidden-action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent theory and provides an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the effort can be observed. However, the hidden-action model builds on various explicit and…
We consider a novel pricing and advertising framework, where a seller not only sets product price but also designs flexible 'advertising schemes' to influence customers' valuation of the product. We impose no structural restriction on the…
Data bias, e.g., popularity impairs the dynamics of two-sided markets within recommender systems. This overshadows the less visible but potentially intriguing long-tail items that could capture user interest. Despite the abundance of…
In recommendation settings, there is an apparent trade-off between the goals of accuracy (to recommend items a user is most likely to want) and diversity (to recommend items representing a range of categories). As such, real-world…
For robots acting in the presence of observers, we examine the information that is divulged if the observer is party to the robot's plan. Privacy constraints are specified as the stipulations on what can be inferred during plan execution.…
Logical investigations of the notion of secrecy are typically concentrated on tools for deducing whether private information is well hidden from unauthorized, direct, or indirect access attempts. This paper proposes a multi-agent, normal…
How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by…
Before purchase, a buyer of an experience good learns about the product's fit using various information sources, including some of which the seller may be unaware of. The buyer, however, can conclusively learn the fit only after purchasing…
A sender flexibly acquires evidence--which she may pay a third party to certify--to disclose to a receiver. When evidence acquisition is overt, the receiver observes the evidence gathering process irrespective of whether its outcome is…
Explainable Recommendation has been gaining attention over the last few years in industry and academia. Explanations provided along with recommendations in a recommender system framework have many uses: particularly reasoning why a…
An asymmetric information model is introduced for the situation in which there is a small agent who is more susceptible to the flow of information in the market than the general market participant, and who tries to implement strategies…
In many settings, multiple uninformed agents bargain simultaneously with a single informed agent in each of multiple periods. For example, workers and firms negotiate each year over salaries, and the firm has private information about the…
We study an information theoretic privacy mechanism design problem for two scenarios where the private data is either observable or hidden. In each scenario, we first consider bounded mutual information as privacy leakage criterion, then we…
A monopolist sells goods with possibly a characteristic consumers dislike (for instance, he sells random goods to risk averse agents), which does not affect the production costs. We investigate the question whether using undesirable goods…
Ranking schemes drive many real-world decisions, like, where to study, whom to hire, what to buy, etc. Many of these decisions often come with high consequences. For example, a university can be deemed less prestigious if not featured in a…
Decisions in organizations are about evaluating alternatives and choosing the one that would best serve organizational goals. To the extent that the evaluation of alternatives could be formulated as a predictive task with appropriate…