Related papers: Conditional strategy equilibrium

We examine the tuning of cooperative behavior in repeated multi-agent games using an analytically tractable, continuous-time, nonlinear model of opinion dynamics. Each modeled agent updates its real-valued opinion about each available…

Algorithms for equilibrium computation generally make no attempt to ensure that the computed strategies are understandable by humans. For instance the strategies for the strongest poker agents are represented as massive binary files. In…

Nguyen et al. [1] introduced altruistic hedonic games in which agents' utilities depend not only on their own preferences but also on those of their friends in the same coalition. We propose to extend their model to coalition formation…

Cooperative games can be distinguished as non-cooperative games in which players can freely sign binding agreements to form coalitions. These coalitions inherit a joint strategy set and seek to maximize collective payoffs. When the payoffs…

We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…

Intention recognition is an important characteristic of intelligent agents. In their interactions with others, they try to read others' intentions and make an image of others to choose their actions accordingly. While the way in which…

This paper models games where the strategies are nodes of a graph G (we denote them as G-games) and in presence of coalition structures. The cases of one-shot and repeated games are presented. In the latter situation, coalitions are assumed…

In many settings where multiple agents interact, the optimal choices for each agent depend heavily on the choices of the others. These coupled interactions are well-described by a general-sum differential game, in which players have…

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…

The explicit construction is presented of two-player game satisfying: (i) symmetry with respect to the permutation of the players; (ii) the existence of upper bound on total payoff following from Bell inequality; (iii) the existence of…

Traditional game theory assumes that the players in the game are aware of the rules of the game. However, in practice, often the players are unaware or have only partial knowledge about the game they are playing. They may also have…

This paper develops a mathematical framework for building a position in a stock over a fixed period of time while in competition with one or more other traders doing the same thing. We develop a game-theoretic framework that takes place in…

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…

We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…

Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games wherein a player seeks to satisfy a formula of propositional logic by selecting a truth assignment to a set of propositional variables under his control. The framework has…

Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…

In this paper, we prove the existence of the equilibrium in choice for games in choice form. These games have recently been introduced by A. Stefanescu, M. Ferrara and M. V. Stefanescu. Our results link the recent research to the older…

This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…