Related papers: Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Informati…
It has been shown that one can accommodate data (Bayes) and constraints (MaxEnt) in one method, the method of Maximum (relative) Entropy (ME) (Giffin 2007). In this paper we show a complex agent based example of inference with two different…
When selling many goods with independent valuations, we develop a distributionally robust framework, consisting of a two-player game between seller and nature. The seller has only limited knowledge about the value distribution. The seller…
We study strategic interactions in a broker-mediated market in which agents learn and exploit each other's private information. A broker provides liquidity to an informed trader and to noise traders while managing inventory in a lit market.…
We consider a model where an agent has a repeated decision to make and wishes to maximize their total payoff. Payoffs are influenced by an action taken by the agent, but also an unknown state of the world that evolves over time. Before…
Data collecting agents in large networks, such as the electric power system, need to share information (measurements) for estimating the system state in a distributed manner. However, privacy concerns may limit or prevent this exchange…
The hidden-action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent theory and provides an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the effort can be observed. However, the hidden-action model builds on various explicit and…
A policymaker discloses public information to interacting agents who also acquire costly private information. More precise public information reduces the precision and cost of acquired private information. Considering this effect, what…
Data is the central commodity of the digital economy. Unlike physical goods, it is non-rival, replicable at near-zero cost, and traded under heterogeneous licensing rules. These properties defy standard supply--demand theory and call for…
We undertake a formal study of the value of targeting data to an advertiser. As expected, this value is increasing in the utility difference between realizations of the targeting data and the accuracy of the data, and depends on the…
A principal delegates decisions to a biased agent. Payoffs depend on a state that the principal cannot observe. Initially, the agent does not observe the state, but he can acquire information about it at a cost. We characterize the…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
A monopolist offers personalized prices to consumers with unit demand, heterogeneous values, and idiosyncratic costs, who differ in a protected characteristic, such as race or gender. The seller is subject to a non-discrimination…
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
We study the problem of selling $n$ items to a single buyer with an additive valuation function. We consider the valuation of the items to be correlated, i.e., desirabilities of the buyer for the items are not drawn independently. Ideally,…
We study revenue maximization in settings where agents' values are interdependent: each agent receives a signal drawn from a correlated distribution and agents' values are functions of all of the signals. We introduce a variant of the…
We consider a two-road dynamic routing game where the state of one of the roads (the "risky road") is stochastic and may change over time. This generates room for experimentation. A central planner may wish to induce some of the (finite…
In this paper, we study platforms where resources and jobs are spatially distributed, and resources have the flexibility to strategically move to different locations for better payoffs. The price of the service at each location depends on…
We study the classic principal-agent model when the signal observed by the principal is chosen by the agent. We fully characterize the optimal information structure from an agent's perspective in a general moral hazard setting with limited…
We present our approach to the problem of how an agent, within an economic Multi-Agent System, can determine when it should behave strategically (i.e. learn and use models of other agents), and when it should act as a simple price-taker. We…