Related papers: Core equivalence with large agents
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
The article develops a general equilibrium model where power relations are central in the determination of unemployment, profitability, and income distribution. The paper contributes to the market forces versus institutions debate by…
The sharing of scarce resources among multiple rational agents is one of the classical problems in economics. In exchange economies, which are used to model such situations, agents begin with an initial endowment of resources and exchange…
We suggest that the analysis of incomplete contracting developed by law and economics researchers can provide a useful framework for understanding the AI alignment problem and help to generate a systematic approach to finding solutions. We…
For a simple model we derive analytic expressions of entropy exchange and coherent information, from which relations between them and the concurrence are drawn. We find that in the quantum evolution the entropy exchange exhibits behavior…
The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…
This article reviews the recent advances in the uniqueness and multiplicity of competitive equilibria in models arising in mathematical economics, finance, macroeconomics, and trade.
We show that when firms compete via supply functions, transferring high-cost capacity to the largest, most efficient firm--thereby diversifying its production technologies while increasing concentration--can lower prices by prompting the…
We study one-sided matchings with endowments in the absence of money. It is well-known that a competitive equilibrium may not always exist and that the strong core may be empty in this setting [Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979]. We propose a…
This paper explores the interplay between transfer policies, R\&D, corruption, and economic development using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and a government. The government collects taxes, redistributes fiscal…
This paper addresses the problem of energy sharing between a population of price-taking agents who adopt decentralized primal-dual gradient dynamics to find the Competitive Equilibrium (CE). Although the CE is efficient, it does not ensure…
We consider the age-old problem of allocating items among different agents in a way that is efficient and fair. Two papers, by Dolev et al. and Ghodsi et al., have recently studied this problem in the context of computer systems. Both…
There are several aspects of data markets that distinguish them from a typical commodity market: asymmetric information, the non-rivalrous nature of data, and informational externalities. Formally, this gives rise to a new class of games…
Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…
We study the entanglement of a multipartite quantum state. An inequality between the bipartite concurrence and the multipartite concurrence is obtained. More effective lower and upper bounds of the multipartite concurrence are obtained. By…
In this paper I discuss truthful equilibria in common agency models. Specifically, I provide general conditions under which truthful equilibria are plausible, easy to calculate and efficient. These conditions generalize similar results in…
Large language models (LLMs) have been widely used as agents to complete different tasks, such as personal assistance or event planning. While most of the work has focused on cooperation and collaboration between agents, little work…
We study a heterogeneous agent macroeconomic model with an infinite number of households and firms competing in a labor market. Each household earns income and engages in consumption at each time step while aiming to maximize a concave…
Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) is a classic solution to the problem of fair and efficient allocation of goods [Foley'67, Varian'74]. Every agent receives an equal budget of artificial currency with which to purchase…
An intelligent agent may in general pursue multiple procedural goals simultaneously, which may lead to arise some conflicts (incompatibilities) among them. In this paper, we focus on the incompatibilities that emerge due to resources…