Related papers: Correlated Choice
We determine the quality of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting in which the agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these costs form a metric. We assume that these costs are unknown to…
We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…
Many scenarios where agents with restrictions compete for resources can be cast as maximum matching problems on bipartite graphs. Our focus is on resource allocation problems where agents may have restrictions that make them incompatible…
We consider marginal log-linear models for parameterizing distributions on multidimensional contingency tables. These models generalize ordinary log-linear and multivariate logistic models, besides several others. First, we obtain some…
We investigate an iterative deliberation process for an agent community wishing to make a joint decision. We develop a general model consisting of a community of n agents, each with their initial ideal point in some metric space (X, d),…
For two independent, almost surely finite random variables, independence of their minimum (time) and the event that one of them is either greater, equal or less than the other (cause) is completely characterized. It is shown that, other…
We present three necessary separability criteria for bipartite mixed states, the violation of each of these conditions is a sufficient condition for entanglement. Some ideas on the issue of finding a necessary and sufficient criterion of…
We study a model of a population making a binary decision based on information spreading within the population, which is fully connected or covering a square grid. We assume that a fraction of the population wants to make the choice of the…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant computations and determine the truth value of all relevant logical/mathematical…
Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most…
We initiate a novel direction in randomized social choice by proposing a new definition of agent utility for randomized outcomes. Each agent has a preference over all outcomes and a {\em quantile} parameter. Given a {\em lottery} over the…
When does society eventually learn the truth, or take the correct action, via observational learning? In a general model of sequential learning over social networks, we identify a simple condition for learning dubbed excludability.…
We consider continuous-time consensus seeking systems whose time-dependent interactions are cut-balanced, in the following sense: if a group of agents influences the remaining ones, the former group is also influenced by the remaining ones…
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…
An agent acquires a costly flexible signal before making a decision. We explore to what degree knowledge of the agent's information costs helps predict her behavior. We establish an impossibility result: learning costs alone generate no…
We study the problem of selecting a member of a set of agents based on impartial nominations by agents from that set. The problem was studied previously by Alon et al. and Holzman and Moulin and has important applications in situations…
I provide a model of rational inattention with heterogeneity and prove it is observationally equivalent to a state-dependent stochastic choice model subject to attention costs. I demonstrate that additive separability of unobservable…
Two processors output correlated sequences using the help of a coordinator with whom they individually share independent randomness. For the case of unlimited shared randomness, we characterize the rate of communication required from the…