Related papers: Informational Robustness of Common Belief in Ratio…

We characterize common assumption of rationality of 2-person games within an incomplete information framework. We use the lexicographic model with incomplete information and show that a belief hierarchy expresses common assumption of…

Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation using an incomplete information game. The true game may involve correlated, duplicated belief hierarchies, but the analyst lacks knowledge of the correlation structure and can only…

Common knowledge/belief in rationality is the traditional standard assumption in analysing interaction among agents. This paper proposes a graph-based language for capturing significantly more complicated structures of higher-order beliefs…

We discuss recent work for causal inference and predictive robustness in a unifying way. The key idea relies on a notion of probabilistic invariance or stability: it opens up new insights for formulating causality as a certain risk…

Information theory provides a mathematical foundation to measure uncertainty in belief. Belief is represented by a probability distribution that captures our understanding of an outcome's plausibility. Information measures based on…

In this paper, we show that coherent sets of gambles can be embedded into the algebraic structure of information algebra. This leads firstly, to a new perspective of the algebraic and logical structure of desirability and secondly, it…

We argue that robustness of explanations---i.e., that similar inputs should give rise to similar explanations---is a key desideratum for interpretability. We introduce metrics to quantify robustness and demonstrate that current methods do…

Transparency is a fundamental requirement for decision making systems when these should be deployed in the real world. It is usually achieved by providing explanations of the system's behavior. A prominent and intuitive type of explanations…

In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.…

We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…

Determining an individual's strategic reasoning capability based solely on choice data is a complex task. This complexity arises because sophisticated players might have non-equilibrium beliefs about others, leading to non-equilibrium…

We derive robust predictions in games involving flexible information acquisition, also known as rational inattention (Sims 2003). These predictions remain accurate regardless of the specific methods players employ to gather information.…

This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…

Accurately predicting the relevance of items to users is crucial to the success of many social platforms. Conventional approaches train models on logged historical data; but recommendation systems, media services, and online marketplaces…

We study the robustness of Bayesian persuasion to uncertainty about the receiver's preferences. We analyze two conceptually distinct notions: continuity, in which only the modeler lacks precise knowledge, but where the model's predictions…

We provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on possibility correspondences. We first establish a generic result that links true common beliefs (and, respectively, common knowledge) of players' rationality defined by…

In an interactive belief model, are the players "commonly meta-certain" of the model itself? This paper formalizes such implicit "common meta-certainty" assumption. To that end, the paper expands the objects of players' beliefs from events…

Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…

In many cases commonsense knowledge consists of knowledge of what is usual. In this paper we develop a system for reasoning with usual information. This system is based upon the fact that these pieces of commonsense information involve both…

In this paper the theory of flexibly-bounded rationality which is an extension to the theory of bounded rationality is revisited. Rational decision making involves using information which is almost always imperfect and incomplete together…