Related papers: An Axiomatic Approach to Detect Information Leaks …

We propose an operational measure of information leakage in a non-stochastic setting to formalize privacy against a brute-force guessing adversary. We use uncertain variables, non-probabilistic counterparts of random variables, to construct…

Asynchronous programming has appeared as a programming style that overcomes undesired properties of concurrent programming. Typically in asynchronous models of programming, methods are posted into a post list for latter execution. The order…

The code generation modules inside modern compilers such as GCC and LLVM, which use a limited number of CPU registers to store a large number of program variables, may introduce side-channel leaks even in software equipped with…

We propose a type system to analyze the time consumed by multi-threaded imperative programs with a shared global memory, which delineates a class of safe multi-threaded programs. We demonstrate that a safe multi-threaded program runs in…

Modern processors use branch prediction and speculative execution to maximize performance. For example, if the destination of a branch depends on a memory value that is in the process of being read, CPUs will try guess the destination and…

With the growing use of information technology in all life domains, hacking has become more negatively effective than ever before. Also with developing technologies, attacks numbers are growing exponentially every few months and become more…

Programmers of cryptographic applications written in C need to avoid common mistakes such as sending private data over public channels, modifying trusted data with untrusted functions, or improperly ordering protocol steps. These secrecy,…

Information-flow control systems often enforce progress-insensitive noninterference, as it is simple to understand and enforce. Unfortunately, real programs need to declassify results and endorse inputs, which noninterference disallows,…

Formal verification provides strong guarantees of correctness of software, which are especially important in safety or security critical systems. Hoare logic is a widely used formalism for rigorous verification of software against…

Automated software verification of concurrent programs is challenging because of exponentially large state spaces with respect to the number of threads and number of events per thread. Verification techniques such as model checking need to…

This thesis addresses the foundational aspects of formal methods for applications in security and in particular in anonymity. More concretely, we develop frameworks for the specification of anonymity properties and propose algorithms for…

Geo-replicated systems provide a number of desirable properties such as globally low latency, high availability, scalability, and built-in fault tolerance. Unfortunately, programming correct applications on top of such systems has proven to…

A new logic for verification of security policies is proposed. The logic, HyperLTL, extends linear-time temporal logic (LTL) with connectives for explicit and simultaneous quantification over multiple execution paths, thereby enabling…

Detecting leaks in Water Distribution Networks (WDN) using sensors has become crucial towards an efficient management of water resources. The leak detection methods that use this data rely on the correctness of the acquired data. However,…

Language models are deployed in settings that require compartmentalization: system prompts should not be disclosed, chain-of-thought reasoning is hidden from users, and sensitive data passes through shared contexts. We test whether models…

We show how support for information-flow security proofs could be added on top of the Verified Software Toolchain (VST). We discuss several attempts to define information flow security in a VST-compatible way, and present a statement of…

We study privacy leakage in the reasoning traces of large reasoning models used as personal agents. Unlike final outputs, reasoning traces are often assumed to be internal and safe. We challenge this assumption by showing that reasoning…

Timing channels are information flows, encoded in the relative timing of events, that bypass the system's protection mechanisms. Any microarchitectural state that depends on execution history and affects the rate of progress of later…

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt…

We present an approach for verifying systems at runtime. Our approach targets distributed systems whose components communicate with monitors over unreliable channels, where messages can be delayed, reordered, or even lost. Furthermore, our…