Related papers: Information Design in Multi-stage Games
Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation using an incomplete information game. The true game may involve correlated, duplicated belief hierarchies, but the analyst lacks knowledge of the correlation structure and can only…
Mean field games are limit models for symmetric $N$-player games with interaction of mean field type as $N\to\infty$. The limit relation is often understood in the sense that a solution of a mean field game allows to construct approximate…
This survey is organized around three main topics: models, econometrics, and empirical applications. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, introduces the concept of Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium, discusses existence and…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…
This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…
Quantum game theory has emerged as a promising candidate to further the understanding of quantum correlations. Motivated by this, it is demonstrated that pure strategy Nash equilibria can be utilised as a mechanism to witness and determine…
Adding game elements to higher education is an increasingly common practice. As a result, many recent empirical studies focus on studying the effectiveness of gamified or game-based educational experiences. The findings of these studies are…
In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose period-by-period behavior probabilities or empirical distributions converge to some notion of equilibria of the stage game. Our primary focus is on…
We investigate how the framework of mean-field games may be used to investigate strategic interactions in large heterogeneous populations. We consider strategic interactions in a population of players which may be partitioned into…
Understanding the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning is a fundamental problem of great practical relevance in many applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning. While it is known that learning dynamics converge to…
Continuous games are multiplayer games in which strategy sets are compact and utility functions are continuous. These games typically have a highly complicated structure of Nash equilibria, and numerical methods for the equilibrium…
Nonlocality, one of the most remarkable aspects of quantum mechanics, is closely related to Bayesian game theory. Quantum mechanics can offer advantages to some Bayesian games, if the payoff functions are related to Bell inequalities in…
We consider shared workspace scenarios with humans and robots acting to achieve independent goals, termed as parallel play. We model these as general-sum games and construct a framework that utilizes the Nash equilibrium solution concept to…
In this paper, we introduce a novel equilibrium concept, called the equilibrium cycle, which seeks to capture the outcome of oscillatory game dynamics. Unlike the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which defines a fixed point of mutual best…
Cooperative Bayesian games (BGs) can model decision-making problems for teams of agents under imperfect information, but require space and computation time that is exponential in the number of agents. While agent independence has been used…
We study lower bounds on the query complexity of determining correlated equilibrium. In particular, we consider a query model in which an n-player game is specified via a black box that returns players' utilities at pure action profiles. In…
Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well understood. Computing the value of such a game is straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent on a random state of the game known to one, both, or neither of the players, the…
We propose a continuous version of the classical Gale--Berlekamp switching game. We also study a weighted version of this new continuous game. The main results of this paper concern growth estimates for the corresponding optimization…
Modern control systems are featured by their hierarchical structure composing of cyber, physical, and human layers. The intricate dependencies among multiple layers and units of modern control systems require an integrated framework to…
We investigate the dynamics of Q-learning in a class of generalized Braess paradox games. These games represent an important class of network routing games where the associated stage-game Nash equilibria do not constitute social optima. We…