Related papers: Stability theory of game-theoretic group feature e…
Marginal models involve restrictions on the conditional and marginal association structure of a set of categorical variables. They generalize log-linear models for contingency tables, which are the fundamental tools for modelling the…
The formal study of coalition formation in multi-agent systems is typically realized in the framework of hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this branch of research has been on the existence and the…
Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…
Coalition formation is concerned with the question of how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. Deviating from most of the previous work, we consider an online variant of the problem, where…
In this paper, we study the "stability" of machine learning (ML) models within the context of larger, complex NLP systems with continuous training data updates. For this study, we propose a methodology for the assessment of model stability…
In a world where Machine Learning (ML) is increasingly deployed to support decision-making in critical domains, providing decision-makers with explainable, stable, and relevant inputs becomes fundamental. Understanding how machine learning…
We investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve sets of plays in order to express useful constraints on strategies that are not \mu-calculus definable. Typically, we can state that a strategy is…
We consider a class of deterministic mean field games, where the state associated with each player evolves according to an ODE which is linear w.r.t. the control. Existence, uniqueness, and stability of solutions are studied from the point…
Shapley values, a game theoretic concept, has been one of the most popular tools for explaining Machine Learning (ML) models in recent years. Unfortunately, the two most common approaches, conditional and marginal, to calculating Shapley…
We discuss in detail the derivation of stochastic differential equations for the continuum time limit of the Minority Game. We show that all properties of the Minority Game can be understood by a careful theoretical analysis of such…
In hedonic games, players form coalitions based on individual preferences over the group of players they could belong to. Several concepts to describe the stability of coalition structures in a game have been proposed and analysed in the…
Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and explicit interaction where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they additionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding $N$-player games, they are of…
Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
Training stability is typically regarded as a prerequisite for reliable optimization in large language models. In this work, we analyze how stabilizing training dynamics affects the induced generation distribution. We show that under…
Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…
Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…
We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…