Related papers: False Data Injection Attack Against Power System S…
Most traditional false data injection attack (FDIA) detection approaches rely on a key assumption, i.e., the power system can be accurately modeled. However, the transmission line parameters are dynamic and cannot be accurately known during…
False data injection attacks (FDIAs) represent a major class of attacks that aim to break the integrity of measurements by injecting false data into the smart metering devices in power grids. To the best of authors' knowledge, no study has…
Load redistribution (LR) attacks represent a practical and sophisticated form of false data injection (FDI) attacks, where the attacker manipulates grid data to influence economic operations of the grid through misleading security…
The rapid growth of AI-driven data centers and large-scale energy storage systems is increasing the reliance of power system operation on real-time measurement data and automated decision-making. However, many existing detection methods…
This paper presents a hybrid data-driven physics model-based framework for real time monitoring in smart grids. As the power grid transitions to the use of smart grid technology, it's real time monitoring becomes more vulnerable to cyber…
This paper introduces a novel, fully distributed control framework for DC microgrids, enhancing resilience against exponentially unbounded false data injection (EU-FDI) attacks. Our framework features a consensus-based secondary control for…
Data attacks on meter measurements in the power grid can lead to errors in state estimation. This paper presents a new data attack model where an adversary produces changes in state estimation despite failing bad-data detection checks. The…
This paper assesses the resilience of IEC 61850 digital substations under False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) targeting the Sampled Values (SV) protocol. The multicast nature of SV, while enabling time-critical automation, exposes…
In this paper, we consider the problems of state estimation and false data injection detection in smart grid when the measurements are corrupted by colored Gaussian noise. By modeling the noise with the autoregressive process, we estimate…
As one of the largest and most complex systems on earth, power grid (PG) operation and control have stepped forward as a compound analysis on both physical and cyber layers which makes it vulnerable to assaults from economic and security…
Robotic systems are vulnerable to False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs), where adversaries corrupt sensor signals to gain malicious control. Feedback linearization exposes robotic systems to integrator vulnerability, making them susceptible…
This study proposes a control strategy to ensure the safe operation of modern power systems with high penetration of inverter-based resources (IBRs) within an optimal operation framework. The objective is to obtain operating points that…
This paper addresses the challenge of amplitude-unbounded false data injection (FDI) attacks targeting the sensor-to-controller (S-C) channel in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). We introduce a resilient tube-based model predictive control…
The integration of information and physical systems in modern power grids has heightened vulnerabilities to False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs), threatening the secure operation of power cyber-physical systems (CPS). This paper reviews…
The normal operation of power system relies on accurate state estimation that faithfully reflects the physical aspects of the electrical power grids. However, recent research shows that carefully synthesized false-data injection attacks can…
False data injection attacks (FDIA) are a main category of cyber-attacks threatening the security of power systems. Contrary to the detection of these attacks, less attention has been paid to identifying the attacked units of the grid. To…
Fault injection (FI) is a powerful attack methodology allowing an adversary to entirely break the security of a target device. As finite-state machines (FSMs) are fundamental hardware building blocks responsible for controlling systems,…
Smart grid monitoring, automation and control will completely rely on PMU based sensor data soon. Accordingly, a high throughput, low latency Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure should be opted in this regard. Due…
The number of installed remote terminal units (RTU) is on the rise, increasing the observability and control of the power system. RTUs enable sending data to and receiving data from a control center in the power system. A distribution grid…
Many researchers have studied false data injection (FDI) attacks in power state estimation, but existing state estimation approaches are still highly vulnerable to FDI attacks. In this paper, we investigate the problem of the above three…