Related papers: Deciphering chaos in evolutionary games
By specifying behaviour across multiple agents, social norms are a coordination approach to resolving social dilemmas. Decentralized and wide adoption can be achieved by norms whose prescription involves interpreting stochastic signals in…
Building upon the eco-evolutionary game dynamics framework established by Tilman et al., we investigate stochastic fluctuations in a two-strategy system incorporating environmental feedback mechanisms, where the payoff matrix exhibits…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
We consider a class of dynamic collective choice models with social interactions, whereby a large number of non-uniform agents have to individually settle on one of multiple discrete alternative choices, with the relevance of their would-be…
How cooperation emerges in human societies is still a puzzle. Evolutionary game theory has been the standard framework to address this issue. In most models, every individual plays with all others, and then reproduce and die according to…
In this paper, we consider the replicator-mutator dynamics for pairwise social dilemmas where the payoff entries are random variables. The randomness is incorporated to take into account the uncertainty, which is inevitable in practical…
Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…
Game theory is usually considered applied mathematics, but a few game-theoretic results, such as Borel determinacy, were developed by mathematicians for mathematics in a broad sense. These results usually state determinacy, i.e. the…
Evolutionary game dynamics are often studied in the context of different population structures. Here we propose a new population structure that is inspired by simple multicellular life forms. In our model, cells reproduce but can stay…
The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…
We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time. The peculiarity of the game is that players are characterized by time-evolving types, and so reasonably their actions should not anticipate the future values of their types. When…
Dynamic games are powerful tools to model multi-agent decision-making, yet computing Nash (generalized Nash) equilibria remains a central challenge in such settings. Complexity arises from tightly coupled optimality conditions, nested…
Long-term evolutionary processes can strongly influence common-pool resource conservation by generating new traits or behaviours that modify the feedback between population strategies and the resource state. Here we develop an…
Aiming to provide a new class of game dynamics with good long-term rationality properties, we derive a second-order inertial system that builds on the widely studied "heavy ball with friction" optimization method. By exploiting a well-known…
We present detailed numerical results for a modified form of the so-called Minority Game, which provides a simplified model of a competitive market. Each agent has a limited set of strategies, and competes to be in a minority. An…
Computing an equilibrium in congestion games can be challenging when the number of players is large. Yet, it is a problem to be addressed in practice, for instance to forecast the state of the system and be able to control it. In this work,…
We study the dynamics of simple congestion games with two resources where a continuum of agents behaves according to a version of Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) algorithm. The dynamics is characterized by two parameters: the…
The modelling of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations requires microscopic processes that determine how strategies spread. The exact details of these processes are often chosen without much further consideration. Different types…
Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite…
In order to accommodate the empirical fact that population structures are rarely simple, modern studies of evolutionary dynamics allow for complicated and highly-heterogeneous spatial structures. As a result, one of the most difficult…