Related papers: Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching…
Search and matching increasingly takes place on online platforms. These platforms have elements of centralized and decentralized matching; platforms can alter the search process for its users, but are unable to eliminate search frictions…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…
We study adaptive two-sided assortment optimization for revenue maximization in choice-based matching platforms. The platform has two sides of agents, an initiating side, and a responding side. The decision-maker sequentially selects agents…
To address efficiency and design challenges in choice-based matching platforms, we introduce a two-sided assortment optimization framework under general choice preferences. The goal in this problem is to maximize the expected number of…
Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
We develop a framework for the analysis of large-scale Ad-auctions where adverts are assigned over a continuum of search types. For this pay-per-click market, we provide an efficient mechanism that maximizes social welfare. In particular,…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
We study a continuous-time, infinite-horizon dynamic bipartite matching problem. Suppliers arrive according to a Poisson process; while waiting, they may abandon the queue at a uniform rate. Customers on the other hand must be matched upon…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
We study one-sided matching problems where $n$ agents have preferences over $m$ objects and each of them need to be assigned to at most one object. Most work on such problems assume that the agents only have ordinal preferences and usually…
We study the problem of social welfare maximization in bilateral trade, where two agents, a buyer and a seller, trade an indivisible item. We consider arguably the simplest form of mechanisms -- the fixed-price mechanisms, where the…
We study a dynamic matching problem on a two-sided platform with unbalanced patience, in which long-lived supply accumulates over time with a unit waiting cost per period, while short-lived demand departs if not matched promptly. High- or…
Stochastic matching is the stochastic version of the well-known matching problem, which consists in maximizing the rewards of a matching under a set of probability distributions associated with the nodes and edges. In most stochastic…
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
This paper proposes a computationally efficient mechanism for multi-dimensional matching markets where agents report preferences over object features rather than complete utility assessments. We use Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
On-line firms deploy suites of software platforms, where each platform is designed to interact with users during a certain activity, such as browsing, chatting, socializing, emailing, driving, etc. The economic and incentive structure of…
Sponsored search auctions are commonly modeled as an assignment of a fixed set of slots (positions) to a set of advertisers, with welfare maximization being reducible to a standard matching problem. Motivated by modern ad formats, we study…