Related papers: A Regret Analysis of Bilateral Trade
We consider the problem of learning optimal reserve price in repeated auctions against non-myopic bidders, who may bid strategically in order to gain in future rounds even if the single-round auctions are truthful. Previous algorithms,…
We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item's value only if the auction is won. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to…
The proliferation of the Internet has led to the emergence of online advertising, driven by the mechanics of online auctions. In these repeated auctions, software agents participate on behalf of aggregated advertisers to optimize for their…
Policy optimization methods are popular reinforcement learning algorithms in practice. Recent works have built theoretical foundation for them by proving $\sqrt{T}$ regret bounds even when the losses are adversarial. Such bounds are tight…
We consider the problem of a firm seeking to use personalized pricing to sell an exogenously given stock of a product over a finite selling horizon to different consumer types. We assume that the type of an arriving consumer can be observed…
In the setting of online learning, Implicit algorithms turn out to be highly successful from a practical standpoint. However, the tightest regret analyses only show marginal improvements over Online Mirror Descent. In this work, we shed…
In a low-rank linear bandit problem, the reward of an action (represented by a matrix of size $d_1 \times d_2$) is the inner product between the action and an unknown low-rank matrix $\Theta^*$. We propose an algorithm based on a novel…
We consider a linear stochastic bandit problem involving $M$ agents that can collaborate via a central server to minimize regret. A fraction $\alpha$ of these agents are adversarial and can act arbitrarily, leading to the following tension:…
We consider the problem of welfare maximization in two-sided markets using simple mechanisms that are prior-independent. The Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem shows that even for bilateral trade, there is no feasible (IR,…
Research on the multi-armed bandit problem has studied the trade-off of exploration and exploitation in depth. However, there are numerous applications where the cardinal absolute-valued feedback model (e.g. ratings from one to five) is not…
In this paper, we study the problem of fair sequential decision making with biased linear bandit feedback. At each round, a player selects an action described by a covariate and by a sensitive attribute. The perceived reward is a linear…
We study the pricing problem faced by a firm that sells a large number of products, described via a wide range of features, to customers that arrive over time. Customers independently make purchasing decisions according to a general choice…
We study online resource allocation among N interacting modules over T rounds. Unlike standard online optimization, costs are endogenous: they depend on the full allocation vector through an interaction matrix W encoding pairwise…
Motivated by online advertising auctions, we consider repeated Vickrey auctions where goods of unknown value are sold sequentially and bidders only learn (potentially noisy) information about a good's value once it is purchased. We adopt an…
In online exploration systems where users with fixed preferences repeatedly arrive, it has recently been shown that O(1), i.e., bounded regret, can be achieved when the system is modeled as a linear contextual bandit. This result may be of…
We study the problem of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a selfish mediator who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. We consider a setting where the mediator does not have information advantage and the buyer's…
We design simple mechanisms to approximate the Gains from Trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with multiple unit-supply sellers and multiple unit-demand buyers. A classical impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that even…
This paper investigates a class of games with large strategy spaces, motivated by challenges in AI alignment and language games. We introduce the hidden game problem, where for each player, an unknown subset of strategies consistently…
Swap regret is a notion that has proven itself to be central to the study of general-sum normal-form games, with swap-regret minimization leading to convergence to the set of correlated equilibria and guaranteeing non-manipulability against…
Motivated by pricing in ad exchange markets, we consider the problem of robust learning of reserve prices against strategic buyers in repeated contextual second-price auctions. Buyers' valuations for an item depend on the context that…