Related papers: Strategic Customer Behavior in an $M/M/1$ Feedback…
We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of…
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…
This paper analyzes a two-product make-to-stock queueing system where a single production facility serves two customer classes with independent Poisson arrivals. Customers make strategic join-or-balk decisions without observing current…
We introduce a novel single-server queue with general retrial times and event-dependent arrivals. This is a versatile model for the study of service systems, in which the server needs a non-negligible time to retrieve waiting customers upon…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
Examining the behavior of multi-agent systems is vitally important to many emerging distributed applications - game theory has emerged as a powerful tool set in which to do so. The main approach of game-theoretic techniques is to model…
This paper investigates a partially observable queueing system with $N$ nodes in which each node has a dedicated arrival stream. There is an extra arrival stream to balance the load of the system by routing its customers to the shortest…
We introduce the theoretical study of a Platform Equilibrium in a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can join a platform and transact with any buyer or remain off-platform and transact with a subset of…
We study the impact of strategic behavior in labor markets characterized by algorithmic monoculture, where firms compete for a shared pool of applicants using a common algorithmic evaluation. In this setting, "naive" hiring strategies lead…
We investigate a multi-agent decision problem in population games where each agent in a population makes a decision on strategy selection and revision to engage in repeated games with others. The strategy revision is subject to time delays…
We study a system, where a random flow of customers is served by servers (called agents) invited on-demand. Each invited agent arrives into the system after a random time; after each service completion, an agent returns to the system or…
Recent studies indicate that in many situations service times are affected by the experienced queueing delay of the particular customer. This effect has been detected in different areas, such as health care, call centers and…
An important part of the Smart Grid literature on residential Demand Response deals with game-theoretic consumption models. Among those papers, the hourly billing model is of special interest as an intuitive and fair mechanism. We focus on…
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…
We study the design of decision-making mechanism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a dynamic environment. Agents' privately observed preference over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic due to the…
We introduce an analytical model to study the evolution towards equilibrium in spatial games, with `memory-aware' agents, i.e., agents that accumulate their payoff over time. In particular, we focus our attention on the spatial Prisoner's…
We study a variant of Vickrey's classic bottleneck model. In our model there are $n$ agents and each agent strategically chooses when to join a first-come-first-served observable queue. Agents dislike standing in line and they take actions…
This paper investigates the equilibrium convergence properties of a proposed algorithm for potential games with continuous strategy spaces in the presence of feedback delays, a main challenge in multi-agent systems that compromises the…
Nash equilibrium is a central solution concept for reasoning about self-interested agents. We address the problem of synthesizing Nash equilibria in two-player deterministic games on graphs, where players have private, partially-ordered…
We study a discrete-time finite-horizon two-players nonzero-sum stopping game where the filtration of Player 1 is richer than the filtration of Player 2. A major difficulty which is caused by the information asymmetry is that Player 2 may…