Related papers: Cooperation and Reputation Dynamics with Reinforce…
Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism that promotes cooperation in social dilemmas by means of reputation. Although it has been a common practice to represent reputations by binary values, either `good' or `bad', such a dichotomy is a…
The significance of network structures in promoting group cooperation within social dilemmas has been widely recognized. Prior studies attribute this facilitation to the assortment of strategies driven by spatial interactions. Although…
Cooperation and competition coexist and coevolve in natural and social systems. Cooperation generates resources, which in turn, drive non-cooperative competition to secure individual shares. How this complex interplay between cooperation…
Social dilemmas have been widely studied to explain how humans are able to cooperate in society. Considerable effort has been invested in designing artificial agents for social dilemmas that incorporate explicit agent motivations that are…
In this work, we ask for and answer what makes classical temporal-difference reinforcement learning with epsilon-greedy strategies cooperative. Cooperating in social dilemma situations is vital for animals, humans, and machines. While…
The understanding of cooperative behavior in social systems has been the subject of intense research over the past decades. In this regard, the theoretical models used to explain cooperation in human societies have been complemented with a…
Recent reinforcement learning studies extensively explore the interplay between cooperative and competitive behaviour in mixed environments. Unlike cooperative environments where agents strive towards a common goal, mixed environments are…
Indirect reciprocity is one of the main mechanisms to explain the emergence and sustainment of altruism in societies. The standard approach to indirect reciprocity are reputation models. These are games in which players base their decisions…
Communication is fundamental to sustaining reciprocity and cooperation in strategic interactions. We identify and formulate the influence attribution problem as the central optimization difficulty inherent in such dynamics for a learning…
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism by which individuals cooperate with those who have cooperated with others. This creates a regime in which repeated interactions are not necessary to incent cooperation (as would be required for direct…
Understanding the emergence and sustainability of cooperation is a fundamental problem in evolutionary biology and is frequently studied by the framework of evolutionary game theory. A very powerful mechanism to promote cooperation is…
When an individual's behavior has rational characteristics, this may lead to irrational collective actions for the group. A wide range of organisms from animals to humans often evolve the social attribute of cooperation to meet this…
Cooperation is a crucial aspect of social life, yet understanding the nature of cooperation and how it can be promoted is an ongoing challenge. One mechanism for cooperation is indirect reciprocity. According to this mechanism, individuals…
Recent advances in reinforcement learning with social agents have allowed such models to achieve human-level performance on specific interaction tasks. However, most interactive scenarios do not have a version alone as an end goal; instead,…
Recent paradigm shifts from imitation learning to reinforcement learning (RL) is shown to be productive in understanding human behaviors. In the RL paradigm, individuals search for optimal strategies through interaction with the environment…
Reputations provide a powerful mechanism to sustain cooperation, as individuals cooperate with those of good social standing. But how should moral reputations be updated as we observe social behavior, and when will a population converge on…
This is a comment on a recent review article about reputation and reciprocity as mechanisms promoting cooperation. I also discuss the necessary changes for the currently game-theory-based cooperation studies to become a complete theory of…
We study the interpersonal trust of a population of agents, asking whether chance may decide if a population ends up in a high trust or low trust state. We model this by a discrete time, random matching stochastic coordination game. Agents…
To achieve common goals, we often use joint commitments. Our commitment helps us to coordinate with our partners and assures them that their cooperative efforts will benefit themselves. However, if one of us can exploit the other's…
An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain…