Related papers: On Human Capital and Team Stability

Applications such as employees sharing office spaces over a workweek can be modeled as problems where agents are matched to resources over multiple rounds. Agents' requirements limit the set of compatible resources and the rounds in which…

Some aspects of the problem of stable marriage are discussed. There are two distinguished marriage plans: the fully transferable case, where money can be transferred between the participants, and the fully non transferable case where each…

We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal setting, stable…

We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…

The stable roommates problem with $n$ agents has worst case complexity $O(n^2)$ in time and space. Random instances can be solved faster and with less memory, however. We introduce an algorithm that has average time and space complexity…

We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…

In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implements the individually rational correspondence in Nash…

Since Choo and Siow (2006), a burgeoning literature has analyzed matching markets when utility is perfectly transferable and the joint surplus is separable. We take stock of recent methodological developments in this area. Combining…

This paper aims to provide insight into stability of collaboration choices in P2P networks. We study networks where exchanges between nodes are driven by the desire to receive the best service available. This is the case for most existing…

The stable marriage problem, as addressed by Gale and Shapely [1] consists of providing a bipartite matching between n " boys " and n " girls "-each of whom have a totally ordered preference list over the other set-such that there exists no…

The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties,…

The Stable Roommates problem (SR) is characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates: each agent ranks all others in strict order of preference. A solution to SR is then a partition of the agents into pairs so that…

This paper studies multilateral matching in which agents may negotiate contracts within any coalition. We assume scale economies such that an agent substitutes some existing contracts with new ones only if the latter involve a set of…

We explore the consequences of incomplete information in the stable marriage problem. When information capacity of the participants is increased, more favorable games are created and the quality of the matches are also better. The simple…

This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…

Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…

I relate bipartite graph matchings to stable matchings. I prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a saturating stable matching, where every agent on one side is matched, for all possible preferences. I extend my…

Matching plays a vital role in the rational allocation of resources in many areas, ranging from market operation to people's daily lives. In economics, the term matching theory is coined for pairing two agents in a specific market to reach…

We study stable allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods. The problem is well-known to be challenging, and rich enough to encode fundamentally unstable economies, such as the roommate problem. Our approach stems from…

We show how fragile stable matchings are in a decentralized one-to-one matching setting. The classical work of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) suggests simple decentralized dynamics in which randomly-chosen blocking pairs match successively.…