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The Team-maxmin equilibrium prescribes the optimal strategies for a team of rational players sharing the same goal and without the capability of correlating their strategies in strategic games against an adversary. This solution concept can…
We investigate team optimal control of stochastic subsystems that are weakly coupled in dynamics (through the mean-field of the system) and are arbitrary coupled in the cost. The controller of each subsystem observes its local state and the…
Probabilistic settings (e.g., vanishing-error channel coding) and non-probabilistic settings (e.g., zero-error channel coding and adversarial channels) were considered two related but different branches of information theory which do not…
Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards.…
This work studies the problem of ad hoc teamwork in teams composed of agents with differing computational capabilities. We consider cooperative multi-player games in which each agent's policy is constrained by a private capability…
A recent theory shows that a multi-player decentralized partially observable Markov decision process can be transformed into an equivalent single-player game, enabling the application of \citeauthor{bellman}'s principle of optimality to…
This paper investigates the problems arising in the construction of a program to play the game of contract bridge. These problems include both the difficulty of solving the game's perfect information variant, and techniques needed to…
In stochastic optimal control, change of measure arguments have been crucial for stochastic analysis. Such an approach is often called static reduction in dynamic team theory (or decentralized stochastic control) and has been an effective…
Logit dynamics are dynamical systems describing transitions and equilibria of actions of interacting players under uncertainty. An uncertainty is embodied in logit dynamic as a softmax type function often called a logit function originating…
In this paper, we extend the Descent framework, which enables learning and planning in the context of two-player games with perfect information, to the framework of stochastic games. We propose two ways of doing this, the first way…
We consider a two-player zero-sum deterministic differential game where each player uses both continuous and impulse controls in infinite-time horizon. We assume that the impulses supposed to be of general term and the costs depend on the…
In stochastic games with incomplete information, the uncertainty is evoked by the lack of knowledge about a player's own and the other players' types, i.e. the utility function and the policy space, and also the inherent stochasticity of…
We consider a team game reward, and we derive a stochastic Pontryagin's maximum principle for distributed stochastic differential systems with decentralized noisy information structures. Our methodology utilizes the semi martingale…
We describe and develop a close relationship between two problems that have customarily been regarded as distinct: that of maximizing entropy, and that of minimizing worst-case expected loss. Using a formulation grounded in the equilibrium…
Game dynamics, which describe how agents' strategies evolve over time based on past interactions, can exhibit a variety of undesirable behaviours including convergence to suboptimal equilibria, cycling, and chaos. While central planners can…
We consider a game, in which the dynamics is described by a non-linear Volterra integral equation of Hammerstein type with a weakly-singular kernel and the goals of the first and second players are, respectively, to minimize and maximize a…
We present a framework that incorporates the idea of bounded rationality into dynamic stochastic pursuit-evasion games. The solution of a stochastic game is characterized, in general, by its (Nash) equilibria in feedback form. However,…
This paper introduces a bilateral matching mechanism to explain why different populations have different levels of cooperation. The traditional game theory assumes that individuals can acquire their neighbor's information without cost after…
We consider imperfect information stochastic games where we require the players to use pure (i.e. non randomised) strategies. We consider reachability, safety, B\"uchi and co-B\"uchi objectives, and investigate the existence of…
Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well understood. Computing the value of such a game is straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent on a random state of the game known to one, both, or neither of the players, the…