Related papers: Common Information Belief based Dynamic Programs f…
A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player's information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain…
We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the…
We analyze a class of stochastic dynamic games among teams with asymmetric information, where members of a team share their observations internally with a delay of $d$. Each team is associated with a controlled Markov Chain, whose dynamics…
We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…
Dynamic zero-sum games are an important class of problems with applications ranging from evasion-pursuit and heads-up poker to certain adversarial versions of control problems such as multi-armed bandit and multiclass queuing problems.…
We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…
This paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. Let games for some family have common dynamics, running costs and capabilities of players, and let these games differ in densities only. We show that the Dynamic Programming…
Zero-sum stochastic games generalize the notion of Markov Decision Processes (i.e. controlled Markov chains, or stochastic dynamic programming) to the 2-player competitive case : two players jointly control the evolution of a state…
We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…
Information gathering while interacting with other agents under sensing and motion uncertainty is critical in domains such as driving, service robots, racing, or surveillance. The interests of agents may be at odds with others, resulting in…
We consider a class of two-player dynamic stochastic nonzero-sum games where the state transition and observation equations are linear, and the primitive random variables are Gaussian. Each controller acquires possibly different dynamic…
We consider a stochastic differential game in the context of forward-backward stochastic differential equations, where one player implements an impulse control while the opponent controls the system continuously. Utilizing the notion of…
In dynamic games with asymmetric information structure, the widely used concept of equilibrium is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). This is expressed as a strategy and belief pair that simultaneously satisfy sequential rationality and…
Stochastic dynamic teams and games are rich models for decentralized systems and challenging testing grounds for multi-agent learning. Previous work that guaranteed team optimality assumed stateless dynamics, or an explicit coordination…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
We formulate and study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic dynamic games with partial and asymmetric information. Information asymmetry introduces fundamental challenges involving \emph{belief representation} and \emph{theory of mind}…
Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesizing reactive processes. In the synthesis of stochastic reactive processes, the traditional model is perfect-information stochastic games, where some transitions of the game graph…
In this paper, we formulate a two-player zero-sum game under dynamic constraints defined by hybrid dynamical equations. The game consists of a min-max problem involving a cost functional that depends on the actions and resulting solutions…
We investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information on the payoff and without Isaacs condition. The dynamics is an ordinary differential equation parametrised by two controls chosen by the players. Each player…
In this second part of our two-part paper, we invoke the stochastic maximum principle, conditional Hamiltonian and the coupled backward-forward stochastic differential equations of the first part [1] to derive team optimal decentralized…